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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study program is to establish design
techniques for the prevention and control of explosive mixtures of
hydrogen and oxygen (or air) within a vehicle interstage. The period
from propellant loading until stage separation is to be evaluated for
an interstage of the general configuration given in Figure i.
In conducting this study_ the limiting conditions for explosive
reactions within the vehicle were established and the characteristics
of explosions as they affect the structural integrity of the interstage
were derived. The response of various typical structures to explosive
forces were evaluated and the critical periods in flight were determined.
The principal methods of prevention and control considered in this
program included aerodynamic and inert purging techniques_ venting_
compartmenting and hardening of structural components.
The criteria that have been developed will enable the vehicle
designer to achieve a system that will perform with the lowest probability
of occurrence of a destructive explosion that is consistent with the
limitations of current knowledge. Because the methods for elimination
or control of explosions must necessarily be defined by the charac-
teristics of the vehicle to which they are to be applied_ recormmendations
as to specific techniques are left to the design engineer.
_h:thur _l._ittle,_Jnr.
IFIGURE 1 GENERAL CONFIGURATION OF INTERSTAGE
II. SUMMARY
A. Explosions in a Vehicle Interstage
Explosions that are the object of this study are characterized
by an increase in gas pressure caused by the release of chemical
energy during the reaction of hydrogen and oxygen (or air). The
occurrence of the chemical reaction and the rate of rise_ magnitude
and duration of the pressures produced will determine whether
destructive forces are created. These factors have been examined in
detail to establish criteria for the prevention and control of inter-
stage explosions.
This study has been primarily concerned with relatively low
(accidental) leakage rates since practical measures for the prevention
and control of explosions do not appear feasible for large releases
of the vehicle propellants in flight. While the vehicle is on the
launch pad and during the early stages in flight_ it is expected that
surfaces within the interstage will have sufficient heat capacity to
vaporize the escaping fluids. Gas phase mixtures will form. Later in
flight_ the interior surfaces may be cooled by prolonged leakage and
condensed phase mixtures may be created.
Gas phase reactions have been of primary interest since at the
lower altitudes_ they are quite readily initiated. With gas phase
mixtures_ it has been concluded that accidental ignition will result_
initially_ in the occurrence of a flame front (deflagration) that
travels through the unreacted mixture at less than the speed of sound.
After some distance of travel_ the combustion wave may increase in
_rthur _._ittle._nc.
intensity and a transition to detonation may take place. The
detonation will be characterized by a combined reaction and shock
front that propagates through the mixture at many times the speed of
sound. At present, there is insufficient information to allow one to
predict the occurrence of a detonation.
If only deflagration occurs, the maximum pressures produced will
be of the order of eight times ambient and may subsist for a significant
interval of time. The peak pressure in a detonation wave will be of
the order of 18 times ambient and will occur for only a short interval.
The effects of both types of explosions will depend upon the total
quantity of material reacted.
B. Effects of Explosions on Interstage Structures
The forces applied to interstage structures resulting from the
relatively slow rising pressures produced by deflagrations will act
as static loads. The ability of structures to withstand these forces
are simply calculated.
In the case of detonation, the rapidly acting forces create dynamic
loads. The response of the structure is a function of the impulsive
force of the pressure wave aswell as its natural period, physical
properties, dimensions and restraint. The evaluation of the effect of
detonations on structures has required that the pressure wave gas
dynamics be evaluated in detail in order to specify the impulsive
characteristics imposed on the structure. Considerable effort was
spent during this study in deriving self-similar solutions for freely
expanding and reflected, spherical detonation waves.
_¢thur _.tittle._nc.
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General relationships were then established for the response of
various types of interstage structures. Calculations were made as to
the quantity of detonable material required to cause failure of
structural components at various ambient pressures. The characteristics
of the S-IC/S-II interstage of the Saturn vehicle were used to provide
quantitative examples.
C. Explosions Hazards during Flight
The probable rate of leakage of propellants into the interstage is
difficult_ if not impossible_ to define. An indication of the maximum
leakage rate that may be possible can be found_ however_ by assuming
that a major failure of a transfer line_ fitting or other component
allows full discharge of the propellants from the engine chill down
circulation system that is in operation prior to stage separation. Under
these conditions_ the maximum leakage rate of liquid hydrogen would be
of the order of 1.2 ibs/sec for systems using the RL-10 or J-2 engines
and 1.5 ib/sec of liquid oxygen (for the RL-10).
The most critical hazards from explosions in the interstage are
believed to exist after launch. The current practice of providing
an active inert purge and monitoring the interstage atmosphere appears
to be adequate prior to lift off.
After launch_ it is expected that gas phase reactions could not
be initiated at altitudes where the ambient pressure exceeds 0.15 psia.
The interval of time from launch until this altitude is reached is of
the order of 120 seconds for a typical vehicle.
_rthur _._ittlc, Bnc.
For explosions caused by gas phase deflagrations_ destructive
pressures would not be expected to occur when the ambient pressure is
somewhat greater than 0.15 psia_ however. For the S-IC/S-II stage of
Saturn_ the limiting ambient pressure would be of the order of 0.3 psia
and the flight time would be approximately ii0 seconds.
The quantity of reactable mixture necessary to cause destructive
gas phase detonation increases with altitude. Since (for a constant
leak rate) the quantity of material will accumulate with time after
launch_ the maximum allowable leakage rate is found to depend upon the
conditions that occur at some 35 seconds after launch. For the Saturn
S-IC/S-II interstage maximum allowable leakage rate for hydrogen and
oxygen is 23 cc/min (6.4 x 10-5 ib/sec) and 12 cc/min (5 x 10-4 ib/sec)
of liquid_ respectively.
During the flight interval from ii0 seconds until stage
separation_ the hazard from the explosion of condensed phase mixtures
will predominate. The worst condition will occur when the condensed
forms of the fuel or oxidant are allowed to collect on a surface or in
a cavity. Detonation pressures of the order of hundreds of thousands
of pounds per square inch resulting from a condensed phase reaction
will be destructive even when only small quantities react. In most
cases_ the maximum allowable leakage rates derived for gas phase
detonations may not allow significant quantities of the condensed phase
to accumulate in a single cavity within the interstage.
The critical periods for the different explosion hazards that may
occur during the flight of a typical vehicle are given in Figure 2.
_vthur/3._ittle._lnc.
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D. Methods of Preventin$ and Controllin$ Explosions
The most positive method of reducing the probability of occurrence
of a destructive explosion involves active purging during flight. When
good mixing is achieved_ the weight of the purging system is high. If
a system relying on controlled streaming of the inert gas to keep
escaping fuel and oxidant separated_ lower weights may be used. In any
case_ experimentation would be required to determine the degree of
effectiveness achieved. For an ideal_ well-stirred_ inert purging system
using nitrogen_ it is estimated that flow rates of the order of 17
ib/sec would be required for a hydrogen leak rate of about 0.05 ib/sec.
Approximately 2.5 ib/sec of helium would be required for the same leak
rate. Storage tank weights for i00 second purges would be a minimum
of 1200 and 800 ibs for nitrogen and helium respectively.
Aerodynamic purging that provides good mixing may be capable of
keeping hydrogen concentrations below the flammable limit for much
higher leakage rates (e.g. approaching chill down recirculation rates
of the order of one ib/sec). Aerodynamic purging can increase the
hazard of an explosion occurring_ however_ when hydrogen leak rates
exceed those for which the purge system is designed.
Increased venting of the interstage may reduce the probability
of occurrence and severity of gas phase detonations. To be effective_
however_ the vent area may have to be as large as 40 percent
of the interstage skirt surface area. During the early stages
of flight_ an increase in vent size may allow air to enter the system
and may upset the balance of forces across the skirt. Increasing the
8
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vent area later in flight would help to reduce the effect and
probability of occurrence of both gas and condensed phase explosions.
Compartmenting of the interstage volume to reduce the quantity
of reactable material that will accumulate will have little practical
utility unless very small compartments are placed around the suspected
points of leakage. This 3 in effect_ would be a modification to reduce
leakage rates and is beyond the scope of this work.
The elimination of small cavities that are quickly cooled and
would serve as collection points for the condensed phases may help to
reduce the probability of occurrence of destructive condensed phase
explosions.
Modifications in design of interstage structures so that they will
survive explosions of greater intensity may be accomplished with many
of the internal components. It has been estimated_ however_ that the
interstage skirt is currently the weakest component. The strengthening
of the skirt to take higher loadings most likely would create undesirably
large increases in weight.
III. CHARACTER OF EXPLOSIONS
A. Introduction
The development and evaluation of concepts for the prevention and
control of explosions has required a detailed analysis of the character
of the hydrogen and oxygen (or air) reactions that may accidentally occur
in an interstage. This review is concerned with a description of the
combustion processes_ and pertinent factors that govern their occurrence
and character. Both gaseous and condensed phase mixtures have been
considered.
9
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B. Gas Phase Reactions
I. Deflasration
a. Combustion of Hydrogen and Oxysen
The hydrogen-oxygen reaction has been the subject of intensive
study by many investigators 3 is reasonably well understood_ and
described in detail in the literature. (I)
The principle reactions that enter into the combustion process have
been established as:
OH + H 2 _ H20 + H I
H + 02 > OH + 0 II
0 + H 2 _, _ OH + H III
This is a chain branching process for there are two OH ions produced
for each molecule of water formed. The two OH radicals can react with
H 2 to form two more molecules of water along with more H ions. This
process_ when repeated_ results in a large multiplication of the pro-
ducts with time.
The controlling reaction is generally believed to be the second of
those given. Whether combustion will take place or not depends upon
the rate of generation of H ions for participating in this reaction
relative to their removal by other processes (e.g. recombination at
the wall). At normal temperatures and pressures_ the source of dis-
sociated molecules (OH and H) is not great enough relative to their
removal and the over-all reaction does not take place. Mixtures of
hydrogen and oxygen at normal temperatures and pressures do not react
spontaneously (they are not hypergolic). A source of external energy
i0
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is required to cause the necessary rate of dissociation. Ignition
sources are generally in the form of heat as exemplified by sparks_
flames and high temperature surfaces.
Although a premixed hydrogen-oxygen system can react spontaneously
in an explosive manner when the pressure and temperature of the mixture
exceeds certain limiting values_ it would not be expected to occur in
the interstage of a launch vehicle. Temperatures above 700°F throughout
the mixture would be required. The hazardous reactions that might take
place in the interstage would be those that are initiated locally by an
external heat source. A combustion zone would then propagate through
the mixture at a rate defined by the heat transfer from the product of
combustion to the reactants and the mass diffusion of hydrogen ions_ or
by compression from a strong shock as in a detonation.
Because of the chain-branching mechanism_ the rate of propagation
(flame speed) is much higher than for many other combustion processes
(i.e. hydrocarbons). Less energy is required to initiate combustion and
much smaller flame traps are required to stop propagation.
The occurrence of combustion in premixed (or mixing stream of)
hydrogen and oxygen depends upon an external source of ignition and the
condition being suitable for the propagation of the flame.
The temperatures and pressures produced when hydrogen and oxygen
(1)
burn without loss of heat to the enclosure are given in Reference
ii
_lrthur t_l.Rittlc,_Jnr.
b. Propagation of Hydrogen-Oxygen (or Air) Flames
The limitations and characteristics of flames propagating in a
premixed hydrogen-oxygen (or air) system are defined by the initial
pressure and temperaturej the mixture composition and factors relating
to the dimensions and geometry of the containing vessel. In the
evaluation of interstage hazards_ the rate of energy release and the
limiting conditions for propagation are of most interest since they
will determine the occurrence and severity of an explosion and may
indicate methods of prevention or control.
(i) Propagation Velocity
The velocity of propagation of laminar flames at ambient conditions
is given for different mixture ratios of hydrogen and oxygen (or air)
in Figure 3. Since the propagation of hydrogen flames becomes turbulent
after a relatively short distance of travel in a premixed system_ the
apparent velocity will generally be much greater than that established
for laminar flow. As discussed later_ turbulence can lead to the
transition to detonation.
There is insufficient knowledge to allow the prediction of the
velocity of propagation for the turbulent case. In general_ however_
the velocity increases with the distance that the flame front travels as
the result of the generation of turbulence by several mechanisms_ all
of which may contribute significantly in any given case. For a flame
propagating in a channel_ turbulence is generated as a result of wall
friction as for any flow with a greater than critical Reynolds number
in a channel or pipe. Obstructions in the confining vessel may contribute
importantly to the generation of turbulence. Even in the absence of
12
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such geometrical effects_ the propagating flame is itself a strong
generator of turbulence. Turbulent burning velocities may exceed the
laminar velocity of the mixture by a factor of i0 or more.
Measurements of propagation velocities have been made under
different test conditions. Those made at reduced pressures by Convair (2)
are of particular interest to the interstage hazard study. In this work
average propagation velocities were measured during the combustion of
hydrogen and oxygen in a cylinder approximately 2 feet in diameter and
20 feet long. Combustion was initiated at one end of the tube and the
time for the combustion front to travel between points at 5 feet and
17.5 feet from the ignition end was measured. The average velocity was
then computed from this data and is reproduced in Figure 4. It may be
seen that the average flame velocity decreases with pressure_ and in
general_ as the mixture ratio departs from stoichiometric.
(2) Composition Limits
When diluents are added to stoichiometric mixtures in the form of
excess fuel_ oxidant, or inert gas in sufficient quantity the combustion
process cannot be propagated. Although the flammability limits depend
upon the experimental method by which they are derived_ the commonly
accepted values for several diluent mixtures are given in Figure 5 for
normal temperature and pressure conditions. The limits will tend to be
narrower at reduced pressures and possibly at reduced temperatures.
Little experimental data is available as to these effects, however.
14
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(3) Inhibitors
A comprehensive screening of other gases as to their ability to
chemically inhibit hydrogen-air reactions has been made by Monsanto_ 3)
The laminar flame speed was used as the criterion for the effectiveness
of the compounds investigated. It was found that some hydrocarbons and
halogenated compounds were the most effective. When 6.6% methane by
volume was added to a mixture of 42 percent hydrogen and 58 percent
oxygen_ the normal flame speed was reduced from 274 cm/sec to 25 cm/sec.
Only 3.3 percent of ethyl chloride was required to produce the same
effect.
The effectiveness of these compounds in practice would be limitedj
however_ by the fact that they will condense at temperatures well
above the boiling point of hydrogen and they are capable of reacting
with oxygen in themselves.
(4) Quenching
Heat losses from the flame to the walls in narrow channels can be
sufficient to prevent propagation of the flame. The minimum width of
the channel that will allow the flame to propagate is referred to as the
quenching distance. This principle forms the basis of flame arrestors
used prevalently with other gaseous systems (e.g. methane and air).
A classical example of the use of flame arrestors is their application
in miners' lamps where a flame was used as the light source. A wire
screen was placed around the flame to prevent general conflagration of
combustible mixtures of methane and air that can occur in the mines.
If a combustible mixture penetrated the screen_ it would be ignited by
the flame. The flame front would not be propagated through the screen_
17
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however, since the dimensions of the perforations were smaller than the
quenching distance for this gaseous mixture.
The quenching distance for a quiescent stoichiometric mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen at ambient temperature and pressure is of the order
of 0.0075 inches. If flow of the reactants occurs along with the
combustion process the quenching distance may be reduced. The very
small values for hydrogen limits the practical utility of flame traps.
Quenching distances for other mixture ratios of hydrogen, oxygen and
diluents are given in Figure 6.
Although there is little data on the effect of pressure and
temperature on quenching distance, it is generally believed that it is
inversely proportional to pressure and may not vary greatly with
temperature. Because of the small quenching distance of hydrogen and
oxygen at sea level pressure_ however, very low pressures would be
necessary before it becomes equivalent to the dimensions of free channels
within the interstage.
(5) Pressure and Temperature Limits
At very low ambient pressures the governing thermal and diffusion
process can no longer sustain combustion and flames cannot be propagated.
Experiments conducted by Convair (2) provide data as to the limiting
pressure for the deflagration of hydrogen and oxygen mixtures. As
previously described, the reactants were contained in a cylinder approxi-
mately 2 feet in diameter and 20 feet long. The initiators, placed
close to one end of the chamber, consisted of an electrical spark whose
energy was estimated to be of the order of 8 joules, a hot wire at an
I
,I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
!
I
18
_vthur _._ittLc,]inr.
2.2
!
1.8
!
._ 1.4
v
o_
! - 1.{3
o
_ ,
i 0.6
0.2
- Helium
1 ,
Nitrogen
Carbon
Dioxide
/
/
\
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fraction of Stoichiometric H 2 - 0 2 Ratio
FIGURE 6 EFFECTS OF DILUENTS ON THE QUENCHING DISTANCE OF
STOICHIOMETRIC MIXTURE OF HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN
(REF. 1)
19
,qrthur i_l._-(ittle._ tt r.
estimated temperature of 2400°F and a hot surface (.57 in. 2) at a
temperature of 1000°F.
Although there was some variation in the limiting pressure with
ignition sourcej the lowest limiting value (0.15 psia with hot surfaces)
would appear to be adequate for design purposes. The effect of compo-
sition on limiting pressures for these experiments is given in Figure 7.
Ambient temperature will have only a slight effect on these limits.
Estimates have been made by assuming that there is a limiting flame
temperature below which deflagration will not occur. As the temperature
is reduced_ the concentration limits are narrowed slightly_ however_ the
limit for the stoichiometric mixture remains unchanged.
c. Initiation of Hydrogen-Oxygen (or Air) Flames
The reaction of hydrogen and oxygen within an interstage requires
a thermal source of initiation. This source must supply sufficient
energy to raise the temperature in some small volume of the mixture to
a level where the rate of production of heat and chain carriers by
chemical reaction is greater than the rate at which heat and chain
carriers are lost to the surroundings by heat conduction and diffusion_
respectively. The critical amount of energy just sufficient for this
purpose is called the minimum ignition energy. Since the ignition
process evidently depends on the volume of gas heated_ by the source_
and upon the rate of heat transfer from the source to this volume 3 the
minimum energy for initiation depends on the nature of the source_ e.g.
whether a hot surface 3 electrical spark_ etc.
The minimum energy of electrical sparks required for initiation
has been examined in some detail. (I) The minimum spark energies
20
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for mixtures of hydrogen_ oxygen and diluents at standard temperatures
and pressures are given in Figure 8. It would be expected that the
minimum energy for a stoichiometric hydrogen-oxygen mixture would be
lower than any of the values given. It has been theoretically estimated
to be between 10 -3 and 10 -4 millijoules. If the rate of energy release
is much slower (e.g. hot wires) than that produced by electrical sparks_
the minimum energy requirements are increased.
2. Detonation
a. Description of Detonation Waves
A detonation is a shock wave that is sustained by the energy
released from the exothermal reaction of a combustible mixture. It is 3
in fact_ formally and theoretically equivalent to a shock wave followed
by a deflagration wave. A detonation differs from a flame (deflagration)
in several respects. The unique propagation velocity of the latter is
governed by the rate at which heat and active particles are transmitted
by conduction and diffusion into the unburned mixture. The reaction
occurring in a deflagration wave is thus initiated by transport processes.
A deflagration wave is always sub-sonic with respect to the unburned
mixture. In contrast 3 a detonation wave is always supersonic with
respect to the unburned mixture. Its propagation velocity is usually
orders of magnitude greater than that of a deflagration wave. Because of
the high speed of the propagation, it can be shown that transport processes
such as diffusion and heat conduction exert a negligible effect on the
propagation of the wave. The chemical reaction is initiated in the
shock front as the result of the shock heating of the unburned mixture.
A further consequence of these characteristics is that the unique
22
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velocity of propagation of a detonation wave is determined by aero-
thermodynamic considerations alone. The main properties of a detonation
wave are described with sufficient accuracy by a simple theory in which
it is assumed that the reaction zone following the shock wave is infinitely
thin. Descriptions of detonation waves 3 the fundamental relations that
govern their character and computations for the hydrogen-oxygen system
may be found in references (13 43 53 63 7_ 8_ 9).
In order for a detonation to occur 3 the reactants must be mixed at
the time of initiation and a shock wave of sufficient strength to
initiate the chemical reaction must be established. This can be
accomplished either by an appropriate igniter or as the result of a
process in which a deflagration wave undergoes a transition to detonation.
After transients associated with the initiation process have died away 3
the detonation velocity will either become constant and remain constant
or the wave will die out. A mixture is said to be detonable if it can
sustain a detonation wave of constant velocity. The pressure of a
detonation wave of constant velocity also remains constant. The thick-
ness of the wave (pressure-time integral) increases 3 however 3 as it
progresses through the reactive mixture 3 the duration of the wave being
proportional to the distance of travel. The pressure and velocity are
usually assumed to be the same for both plane and spherical detonations
in mixtures of the same composition and at the same ambient conditions.
The properties of the detonation wave at the wave front can be
calculated by means of the elementary theory involving Rankine-Hugoniot
expressions for the conservation of mass 3 momentum and energy across
24
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the discontinuity reaction front together with an equation of state
for the reaction products and the Chapman-Jouguet stability condition.
This condition consists of the statement that the stable detonation
velocity is that for which the velocity of the reaction products is
sonic_ as measured by an observer moving with the detonation front.
Values for different hydrogen-oxygen-nitrogen mixtures at various initial
pressures and temperatures are given in Table I.
The normalized gas properties behind a spherical detonation front
are given in the next section of this report.
b. Initiation of Detonation
The probability of occurrence of gas phase detonations and
techniques of preventing them can be significantly related to the
initiation process. The initiation of a detonation in a mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen within an interstage compartment requires the
establishment of a shock wave of amplitude sufficient to initiate a
chemical reaction in the unreacted combustible mixture. In princiPle _
this can be accomplished in one of two ways--either as the result of the
introduction of external energy or through the conversion of energy
released by the deflagration of the reactants themselves. More
fundamentally_ it is desirable to distinguish between initiations
effected by the transmission of a shock wave into the medium from some
exterior agency from those effected by a thermal source of energy. The
first type are exemplified by explosive boosters such as blasting caps;
the second by thermal sources such as electric sparks_ hot wires_ hot
surfaces_ etc. In all cases in which initiation is effected by a thermal
25
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Mixture P1
atm
2H 2 + 02 0.01
0.i0
i .00
i0.00
i00.00
2H 2 + 02 0.01
0.i0
1.00
I0.00
i00.00
(2H 2 + 02)+ I N2 i
(2H 2 + 02)+ 3 N2 1
(2H 2 + 02)+ 5 N2 1
PI _ T 1
P, T
%
TABLE I
DETONATION WAVE CHARACTERISTICS FOR
MIXTURES OF HYDROGEN
(Ref. 9 )
OXYGEN AND NITROGEN
TI P/PI T/TI UD
oK m/sec
200 24.22 14.92 2632
26.28 16.67 2751
28.48 18.73 2875
30.71 21.07 2996
32.78 23.53 3102
400 15.96 7.25 2560
17.33 8.09 2681
18.82 9.09 2809
20.35 i0.25 2937
21.79 ii.51 3055
291 17.37 11.58 2407
291 15.6S i0.32 2055
291 14.39 9.23 1822
Initial pressure and temperature respectively
Detonation pressure and temperature
Detonation velocity
26
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sourc% the initial condition is the establishment of a deflagration
wave followed by a transition from deflagration to detonation. If the
thermal source is an intense onej providing a large excess of energy
over that necessary for the establishment of a deflagration wave 3 the
transition may occur almost instantaneously with a very short induction
time. If_ however_ the thermal source is just sufficient to establish
a deflagration wave_ a transition to detonation may occur after a
relatively long induction time as the result of the effects of essentially
aerodynamic processes.
(I) Initiation by External Sources
Experiments that have been related to ignition by external means
have involved the investigation of both plane detonation waves in shock
tube equipment and spherical waves generated by centrally igniting the
reactant mixture within a container whose radius is usually larger than
that of the normal shock tube.
Experiments by Zeldovich (I0) in which plane detonation waves were
initiated in shock tubes established that 4.1 joules of spark energy
(calculated to have been transferred to a shock wave) were necessary to
produce an instantaneous detonation of a stoichiometric mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen in a shock tube of 30 n_n in diameter. This was
compared to a minimum of 7.2 joules of liberated energy from a lead
nitride explosive found to be required for initiation of the same
mixture. It is to be noted that the minimum energies measured in these
experiments are much greater than the minimum energies necessary for
flame initiation.
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Shock tube experiments performed by Fay(ll)_ Berets (12)_ and
Steinberg (13) involved the use of shocks generated in a secondary gas
to initiate detonation. In these experimentsj an interface was formed
between the hydrogen-oxygen mixture and another gas. Detonation of the
hydrogen-oxygen mixture was observed as it was exposed to shocks of
differing intensities emanating from the secondary gas. The data was
analyzed principally in terms of the minimum shock temperature that
resulted in instantaneous detonation. It was found_ for example_ that
a shock wave temperature as low as 130 ° C could initiate detonation.
Experiments at reduced initial pressures are reported by Richmond (14)
It was found that_ with the equipment used_ detonations could not be
initiated by a spark when the initial pressure of a stoichiometric
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen was below 1/4 of an atmosphere. A shock
wave generated in a secondary gas could initiate detonations (in 2H 2
+ 02) at i/i0 of an atmosphere and below. With stoichiometric hydrogen
and air mixtures detonations could not be initiated by electrical sparks
at initial pressures less than 1/2 an atmosphere.
Experiments with the initiation of spherical detonations in
hydrogen-oxygen mixtures have been reported by Arthur D. Little_
(15_ 16) (17)and by Zeldovich (I0) andInc._ _ AtlanLic Research_ Inc._
Litchfield (18) In the experiments at Arthur D. Little_ Inc._ the
ignition sources were placed at the center of hydrogen-oxygen mixtures
held within i00 feet 3 balloons. Electrical sparksj 6 grain S-68 squibsj
and #6 blasting caps were used as ignition sources. Stoichiometric
mixtures detonated in all cases. It was found_ however_ that the
28
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limits of detonability (as defined by the ratio of hydrogen to oxygen)
decreased as the energy level of the different ignition sources
decreased. With spark ignition, the detonation limits were 35 and 86
percent hydrogen by volume whereas with squib initiation, the limits
were of the order of 30 to 87 percent. The detonation limits with the
blasting cap initiator appeared to approach those generally given as
the standard detonation limits (15 to 90%).
In experiments performed by the Atlantic Research Corporation to
determine the effect of various additives on the ability to initiate
detonation in hydrogen-oxygen mixtures (H2/02 = 62/38) it was found
that 10.8 joules of electrical energy in an exploding bridge wire was
necessary to produce a spherical detonation when no additives were
present. This compared well with another investigator but is not
necessarily consistent with that established by Zeldovich. Estimates
made by Zeldovich indicated that the energy in the shock wave required
to initiate a spherical detonation was of the order of 40 joules.
Tests were also made to investigate the initiation of spherical
detonations by a plane detonation wave emitted from a small tube into
a much larger container. With a stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and
oxgyen in both the tube and container, it was found that there was a
minimum diameter of tube which would cause detonation in the larger
container. This was established to be 19 mm.
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When other materials are added to mixtures of hydrogen and
oxygen_ the energy required to initiate a detonation may decrease.
The results of a search for additives that would significantly inhibit
detonation of hydrogen and oxygen in this manner is reported by the
a (17)Atlantic Research Corpor tion . The amount of energy (released by
an exploding bridge wire) that was required to cause a spherical
detonation to occur was measured for various mixtures of hydrogen_
oxygen and additives. Some of the results of these tests are given
in Table II. Hydrocarbons were effective inhibitors as was methyl
chloride. The compound producing the greatest effect was pentacarbonyl
iron. In general_ it appears that additives that inhibit detonation
also suppress deflagrations. The exceptions to this are ethylene and
some halogen compounds which appear to sensitize rather than inhibit
detonations.
The investigation of the effect of powdered additives has been
very limited. Preliminary results (17j i9) indicate that they may
be quite inefficient in inhibiting the detonation of hydrogen and
oxygen.
(2) Transition from Deflasration to Detonation
In many accidents_ the source of ignition will not be sufficiently
energetic to cause the in_nediate occurrence of detonation. The
mixture will react and a flame front will propagate through the un-
burned material. The subsequent transition of the flame to a detonation
will depend upon the mixture ratioj the geometry of its confinement
and the initial temperature and pressure.
30
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TABLE II
EFFECT OF ADDITIVES ON MINIMUM
IGNITION ENERGY REQUIRED TO
DETONATION MIXTURES OF HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN
Ref. (17)
Additive
Parts per i00 (I)
Control
Nitrogen (2)
Inhibitors
Methane
Propane
Butane
Propylene
Isobutene
Trans-Butene-2
Methyl Chloride
Carbon Monoxide
Pentacarbonyl Iron
Sensitizers
Carbon Tetrachloride
Chloroform
Chlorine
Ethylene
Minimum Ignition Energy
(joules)
1.5 2.0 4.0
13.5 14.5 18
16.5 17.5 37.5
12 14 30.5
14o5 17.5 ---
30 38 ---
46 ......
30 38 ---
16 18 28.5
17 21.5 ---
44 ......
6o5 6 5o5
5 4.75 4o5
9 9.25 I0.5
:02 of 62;38
the minimum ignition energy was 10.8
(i) Parts per I00 of a mixture of H 2
(2) With no additives,
joules.
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The transition to detonation of detonable gas mixtures contained
within tubes of relatively small diameter has been examined and
qualitatively described by a number of investigators (20_ 21_ 22_ 23_ 24!
The combustion process is observed as the flame front propagates in a
tube containing a uniform mixture of the reactants that are ignited by
a relatively weak initiator at a point near the closed end of the tube.
(Initiation at the open end will not result in detonation).
The acceleration of a flame_ which may initially be propagating at
its laminar burning velocity 3 and its ultimate transition to detonation
is the result of a number of different events which may be occurring
simultaneously. It is to be noted that a shock wave is always generated
in advance of a deflagration wave propagating through a combustible
mixture. This shock wave is generated by the flame which is_ in this
respect_ similar to a piston. If the flame velocity is low_ the
shock wave will be of low amplitude and will travel at a velocity that
is many times greater than the flame velocity. The amplitude of the
precursor shock increases as the velocity of the deflagration wave
increases. If the precursor shock is reflected from a wall and if
the reflected wave then interacts with the deflagration wavej the
propagation velocity of the latter will be increased as a result of
this interaction. As the flame front propagates 3 it generates
turbulence and the turbulence thus generated may strongly increase
the velocity of the flame front. These two mechanismsj operating
either together or singly_ depending upon the circumstances_ together
provide a strong mechanism for the acceleration of the flame.
32
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Ultimately_ one of two events may occur. The precursor shock may become
sufficiently intense to initiate reaction in the shock front. If this
occurs_ the resulting flow is_ by definition_ a detonation and_ after
transients have subsided_ a stable detonation results. Alternatively_
the level of turbulence in the flame front may become so great that
the flame brush approximates a stirred reactor. In this event_ the
unburned mixture contained in the highly turbulent flame brush will
undergo a volume explosion_ generating a strong pressure wave and
leading to the establishment of a detonation wave. The distance of
travel of the flame prior to transition depends upon the nature of
the ultimate event and is strongly influenced both by the nature of the
combustible mixture and by the geometry of its container.
The distance over which the deflagration wave must travel before
the occurrence of detonation has been the subject of many experiments.
An empirical correlation of the variables that influence this induction
distance has been made by Bollinger (25) using the following relationship.
s T
c_E_
K = Re b a_ Tb (i)
where Re b = Reynolds number based on the unburned gas conditions
S = burning velocity of the mixture
u
a = speed of sound in the unburned gas mixture
b
T = temperature in the combustion wave
c
Tb = temperature of the unburned gas
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The experimentally correlated relationship between the function K
and induction distance is given in Figure 9. Experimental values used
in deriving the plot are given in Table III. The influence of diluents
on the induction distance for stoichiometric mixtures of hydrogen and
oxygen (established by Bollinger) are given in Table IV.
The induction distances defined by detonation tube experiments can
only be applied in a limited way, however_ to the prediction of effects
produced in actual accident situations. Explosions that may occur in an
interstage would more likely involve reactants that are both not well
mixed nor quiescent and which would be confined by a complex structure
rather than a simple cylinder. The effect of these differences have
been investigated in some instances and considered in a qualitative way
in others.
Tests with larger diameter detonation tubes have established, for
example, that induction distances increase with the diameter of the
confining vessel (25). No data is available on induction distances for
the extreme case of a centrally ignited spherical flame front, however.
The presence of obstructions in the path of the flame has been shown
to influence induction distances (26, 27, 28). Experiments have shown
and theory suggests that a significant decrease in induction distance
can result when the obstruction tends to increase turbulence.
In actual accidents, the location of ignition source relative to
the mixed reactants will also be important to transition. Ignition at,
or close to_ a vent may result in no detonation while ignition in a
confined area may increase the probability of its occurrence considerably.
34
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Quantity
of Diluent
Added
TABLE IV
DETONATION INDUCTION DISTANCES
Ref. (25)
OF HYDROGEN-OXYGEN-DILUENT MIXTURES
Initial Press = i atm.
Induction Distance
(i)
1/2 N 2 228
N 2 ---
1/4 He 185
1/2 He 228
He ---
1/2 Ar 178
Ar 240
1/4 CO 2 239
1/2 CO 2 ---
Initial Temperature : 40°C
(1)
Initial Press = 5 atm.
(2)
Induction Distance
cm. (2) (l) cm.
234 116
--- 244
193 63
240 108
--- 210
180 40
244 108
242 iii
--- 159
(2)
121
255
76
115
218
48
118
120
302
Induction distance determined for maximum propagation rates
of flame in mixture°
Induction distance determined from average propagation rates
of flame in mixture.
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Because of the large number of combinations of variables and lack
of data, no simple criteria have been established that will predict
whether transition will take place or not, in a given accident situation.
Induction distances, however, might be used in some instances as a
relative indication of the degree of improvement achieved in attempts to
reduce interstage explosive hazards.
c. Detonation Limits
The ability of a hydrogen-oxygen mixture to sustain a detonation
once it has been exposed to a shock wave whose strength is equal to or
greater than that defined by the Chapman-Jouget hypothesis is in itself
a basic measure of detonability. The limiting compositions of hydrogen
and oxygen both with and without additives has been examined both
analytically and experimentally from this standpoint.
It was assumed by Bellesj (29)J for example, that a detonation wave
will not be sustained unless the enthalpy increase in the shocked state,
corresponding to the critical Mach number 3 is less than the heat of
combustion. That is_ if the energy release from the chemical reaction
is not great enough relative to the energy requirements of the shock
wavej the detonation will die out. It was found that using this
assumption as a basis_ computations of the limits of detonability of
hydrogen and oxygen3and hydrogen and air at normal temperatures and
pressures agreed with experimental values to within 2.5 percent.
Other work has been based on a constant temperature criterion for
predicting detonation limits (30_ 31). It was assumed that a limiting
minimum temperature behind the shock wave (of the critical Mach number)
was a necessary condition for the detonation to be sustained. An
38
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improved correlation between predicted and experimental values was
obtained on the basis of this hypothesis.
Experiments were also made by Gordon (30) to define the detonation
limits of hydrogen-oxygen and additives. This_ along with the other
data taken from the references noted_ is surmnarized in Figure i0.
The effect of initial pressure and temperature on the detonation
limits has also been considered by the above investigators. The effect
estimated by Belles is shown in Figures ii and 12 where it is predicted
that the limits become wider as the pressure is reduced and as the
temperature is increased.
There is little experimental data_ however_ on limiting pressures
and temperatures beyond which detonation will not occur. Currently_
experiments are being conducted at the University of California_
Berkeley (32) to obtain this kind of information. The detonation testing
is being carried out in relatively large vessels (cylinders - 2 feet in
diameter_ 20 feet long) using primacord as an initiator. The character
of the shock wave is observed as it progresses down the length of the
vessel. Published data on the tests conducted to date indicate that
equimolar quantities of hydrogen and oxygen at an initial temperature of
65 to 75°F will detonate at initial pressures of less than i0 rmn Hg
(0.02 psia) but will not sustain a detonation wave at initial pressures
less than 0.i mm Hg (0.002 psia).
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In other tests in this program, it was found that pressures much
higher than the predicted detonation values occurred during transition
from deflagration to detonation. This provides further confirmation of
a phenomenon pointed out by other investigators.
Tests performed by Convair (2) in the 2 X 20 foot cylinder at
pressures below one psia with the ignition sources previously described
apparently did not result in the occurrence of detonation. However,
there were no restrictions within the chamber, as there would be within
an interstage, that would promote turbulence with the subsequent
transition to detonation. The pressure limit for the occurrence of
detonation within an interstage remains to be established by experiment.
3. Character of Spherical Detonations and Forces Produced
a. General
Although high peak pressures (of the order of 18 times ambient) are
produced in gas phase detonations_ the duration of the pressure wave
for small quantities reacted and at reduced ambient pressures may not
be sufficient to cause damage. In order to establish the limiting
effects of detonations on structural elements in the interstage, the
character of gas phase detonations in terms of pressure as a function
of time have been derived as a part of this study. Both the case of a
freely expanding spherical detonation wave and a wave reflected from a
rigid wall have been examined.
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b. Spherical Detonation
Spherical detonations were selected for study rather than
detonations propagated in cylindrical form or as plane waves, since
they may be more representative of the wave forms generated within an
interstage. They will also produce pressure loadings that are generally
as severe as those achieved by other wave front configurations when
the total distance that the detonation wave has traveled is the same.
In this work self-similar solutions, equivalent to those of
Taylor_ (33) have been used to define the detonation wave properties.
They have been derived using the following assumptions:
(i) The detonation velocity of a spherically expanding detonation
wave is constant and equal to the detonation velocity of a wave
propagating through the same mixture in one dimension 3 as in a pipe.
(2) The reaction zone thickness _ 3 within the wave is sufficiently
small relative to the radius R, of the spherical wave so that it may be
neglected (6 /R_ i).
(3) The burned products behind the Chapman-Jouget point can be
considered to be frozen in composition.
(4) The undisturbed gas is at uniform pressure, density and
composition.
The self-similar solutions are based on the assumption that
V/D, -_ (_)i D2)' _'_ T/D2 and _ / _ i
are unique functions of the parameter
r r
= R = Dt (2)
o
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where V = particle velocity
D = velocity
p= density
_i = density of undisturbed gas ahead of the detonation front
4= gas constant
T = absolute temperature
r = local radius from point of ignition
R = instantaneous shock front radius
o
t = time from initiation of detonation
From the assumption that the solutions are self-similar_ it follows
that the amount of gas having a given velocity will increase as the
detonation wave propagates 3 i.e._ as R increases. Similar statements
can be made regarding the amount of gas having a given static pressure_
dynamic pressure_ temperature_ etc. Therefor% a structural element
will experience a greater impulse_ the further away it is from the point
of initiation of detonation. Thus_ the worst case for an element is that
in which detonation was initiated at the furthest point within the
interstage volume_ and was propagated_ unimpeded by other objects 3 to
the element.
The simplifying feature in self-similar flow with spherical
detonation_ is that all flow properties are functions only of the
dimensionless radius r/R . This functional relationship is maintained
o
while the detonation wave travels outward unimpeded. The gas properties
at the detonation front (behind the Neumann Spike) depend_ as does the
relationship just referred to_ on the nature of the reactions. But
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once the reacting mixture is defined_ the gas properties can be
determined at any location and time once the following two quantities
are specified: (i) the distance r of the point in question from the
center of initiation of the detonation_ and (2) the time since initiation;
this time_ together with the detonation velocity_ determines the
distance R of the wave front from the center of initiation. The ratio
O
of quantities (I) and (2) is the independent variable _ = r/R in the
O
unique functional relationship existing in a self-similar flow pattern.
The variables in the self-similar relation for a stoichiometric
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen have been calculated (see Appendix A).
The variations of reactant velocity_ pressure and density with _ are
shown in Figure 13. For_- 0.5_ the pressure and density are uniform
and the gas is at rest (V = 0). Now as time evolves 3 the point
= 0.5 represents a sphere of increasing radius (r = 0.5 R and
O
R = Dt_ so r = 0.5 Dt_ where D is the detonation velocity). This
O
means that the process leaves behind it a spherical region of gas at
rest.
The gas properties are shown in Figure 13 normalized with respect
to their respective values at _ = i_ the Chapman-Jouguet point at the
detonation wave front. The properties at the wave front are also
shown.
c. Forces Actin$ on Thin Structural Elements
The results of the self-similar solution for a freely expanding
spherical wave have been utilized to predict the forces that would act
on thin structural elements within an interstage. The effect of the
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detonation wave on a thin, pencil-like element is predominantly one
of wind drag_ due to the gas velocity associated with the passing
wave. The initial pressure differential acting on the element as the
front passes by it, will not act long enough to cause damage. The drag
force F may be expressed as
pz,2
F = CDA 2 (3)
where
CD = drag coefficient
A = cross-section of the element in the plane
of the wave front
= gas density
_, = gas velocity
The passing of the wave is, of course, very rapid and the element
experiences an impulsive, rather than a steady, loading. One is,
therefore_ interested in
i
CDA f f%_-2/ at (4)I = yFdt - 2
This can be re-written as
_ _o o C_ _ _ <_)I - 2
Another characteristic of thin structures is that their presence
does not alter the general behavior of the wave, except locally.
Therefore_ a knowledge of the particle velocity due to the passage of
the wave at the location of an element is sufficient for the calculation
of the dynamic drag on that element. But the particle velocity and its
48
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
!
I
!
l
l
l
I
I
II
variation with time is kno_ at any radius from the point of ignition.
Therefore_ the effect of a spherical detonation wave on a thin structural
element can be calculated.
Sinc e
- Dt
I In the differentiation process 3 r_ the location of the structural
element_ is considered fixed. We re-write eq_tion (4) as:
I _ i C__Ap 2 r i
I .o o
I where , _
,,,, A _ 7_ g%
I and the subscript o refers to conditions at the detonation front.
I The function f (A) can be evaluated from the graphs of Figure 13_
beand the integration can performed n_erically. We have done so;
I the result is:
i I. = 4.06 r _ . ib-sec/ft 2 (9)
CDA J i
i where I = ib-sec
i A = ft 2
r = distance from the center of initiation to the element_ ft
_i = density of the undetonated mixture_ ib/ft 3.
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d. Forces Acting on a Rigid Wall
The damage to a wall or other large surface in the interstage is
caused by the pressure acting normal to it. The distribution of gas
properties behind a detonation front at the instant the front reaches
a wall is known provided the point of ignition is located. The pressure
generated at the wall at the time of impact and at all times thereafter
must be calculated. This pressure-time history will depend on the
thickness of the wall and the properties of its material. However 3 since
a perfectly rigid wall will experience the greatest pressuresy it has
been used in this analysis in order to provide a conservative estimate
of the forces that may occur.
Since the initial conditions just before impact are known, it is
possible to calculate the subsequent variation in pressure at the wall.
The treatment of this problem is not specifically reported in the
literaturey the cases most cormmonly treated being those of unsupported
shock waves incident on a rigid wall. However 3 the method for treating
this problem is available and is applied here to the case of a detonation
wave.
Consider a stoichiometric H 2 - 02 mixture of detonable concentration,
initially at rest in a rigid-walled spherical vessel and let a detonation
wave be initiated at the center of the vessel. The detonation wave will
propagate outward toward the container wall, will reach it and be
reflected from it into the burned products. The pressure experienced at
the wall will have a maximum at the instant of impact of the wave front
and will thereafter decrease rapidly with time. The duration is such
50
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( _i0 -3) that for most cases_ the loading on the wall can be
considered as impulsive. Therefore_ in most cases_ the peak pressure
(which is rather simply obtained) has less importance than the
impulse per unit area_ the calculation of which requires a knowledge
of the pressure as a function of time (which is not so simply obtained).
In order to determine the pressure p (t) at the wall_ where t is
time after the wave front first hits the wallj all gas properties and
velocities must be known throughout the vessel just before impact.
For a self-similar pattern with spherical symmetry_ the required infor-
mation is known. More precisely_ the relationships are:
R (%)_ V (_) and P (_)
Since_ at the first instant of impact_ the wave front coincides with the
container wall_ it is possible to writ% for that instant:
A = r/Rwall (10)
Thus_ all gas properties at the first instant of impact can be deduced_
and all the subsequent distributions of properties can in principle be
calculated from the equations of gas dynamics.
The detailed calculations required to determine the behavior of the
reflected wave and the space-time distribution of properties (which
must be solved for simultaneously in order to obtain p (t)) are highly
involved_ and are best carried out with the aid of an electronic
computer.
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An approximation of the pressure-time variations over the interval
during which the major part of the impulse occurs has been derived by
assuming linear time variations of the pressure at the wall and of the
reflected wave velocity as well as a linear radial variation of the gas
properties (p_ v;p ) in the space between the wall and the front of the
inward-traveling reflected wave.
The linearized pressure-time variation at the rigid wall is shown
in Figure 14.
The resulting impulse on the wall is:
I 50.6R ib-sec/ft 2 (Ii)
: wall 1
where Rwal i
The duration of the pulse is
-5
t = 3.2 x i0 Rail
where again Rail is in feet.
= distance between ignition point and wall (feet)
= density of undetonated mixture (ib/ft 3)
see
The interstage volume is not generally spherical in shape and few
of the elements of interest (e.g._ the outer surface of an engine
nozzle) may present concave spherical surfaces to an oncoming wave
initiated elsewhere in the interstage. The question then arises as
to the significance of the results 3 based as they are on spherical
symmetry. The following discussion is intended to clarify this question.
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During the impulsive period_ the reflected shock wave travels only
a short distance toward the center of symmetry. Thus_ the impulse
experienced at the wall is the result of gas-dynamical reactions occurring
within a relatively thin shell of thickness less than one-tenth the
container diameter. Therefore, a local decrease in wall curvature even
to zero curvature (i.e._ when the wall is locally planar) will not alter
these reactions seriously and the impulse will not decrease by a large
amount_ for a given ignition point-to-wall distance.
Of course_ if the change of curvature is continued (the wall now
offering a convex surface to the incoming wave)_ the resulting impulse
will decreas% tending toward that found for a small obstruction (see
the preceding section).
If_ on the other hand_ the curvature (concavity) is increased
appreciably (e.g._ a local distortion seen as a blister from outside the
container and as a recess from inside)_ the impulse per unit area will
increase. Eventually_ the impulse can become quite large_ for instance_
in the case where the inner surface of the container has in it wedge-
like or cone-like recesses. This case has not been treated in the analysis
of the effects of detonation waves on structures. Where an interstage
component has a configuration of this type_ an allowance must be made
for the lack of conservativeness in the analysis.
In summary_ the expression given for impulse per unit area applies
(at a given distance Rail from the point of initiation) not only to
perfectly spherical containers_ but also to those having cylindrical
surfaces ( concave on the side of the detonation) and even to
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relatively flat surfaces. In the formula_ Rwall always represents the
distance between the ignition point and the wall--only in the
coincidental case of a spherical vessel with ignition at the geometric
center does Rwall also represent the radius of the container wall.
C. Condensed Phase Explosions
The following mixtures containing condensed phases of either or
both hydrogen and oxygen may occur within an interstage during flight:
Gaseous hydrogen--liquid oxygen
Gaseous hydrogen--solid oxygen
Liquid hydrogen--solid oxygen
Solid hydrogen--solid oxygen
Other combinations would be thermally incompatible and cannot be
maintained in mixed form except for very short intervals of time.
Until recently_ there has been no experimental effort to determine
the combustion characteristics of these mixtures. It is understood_
however_ that this is to be accomplished in a program to be sponsored
shortly by George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.
In the first two cases where particles of oxygen are dispersed in
gaseous hydrogen_ the propagation of the chemical reaction will be
similar to gas phase reactions. Thermal and diffusion transport will
govern the propagation of the flame. When the particles are small_
the propagation rates will approach those of the gas phase condition.
When they are large_ the rate of heat release may be effected by the
rate of evaporation of the particles.
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In general_ it is expected that the composition limits for de-
flagration will be reduced and the quenching distance increased over
that of a gas phase mixture at the same initial temperature and pressure.
Since some of the oxygen must be evaporated in order to initiate the
reaction, minimum ignition energy requirements would be much greater.
The propagation of detonation will require that the oxygen particles
be sufficiently small so that their evaporation_ mixing and reaction with
the hydrogen gas can take place in a short enough interval to sustain
the fast moving shock wave. The detonation pressures and velocities
will be only slightly higher than the gas phase case when the concentration
of oxygen is low. With higher concentrations of oxygen_ the detonation
pressures will be higher because of the increased density of the mixture.
The deflagration and detonation of the other two combinations listed
(LH2 - S02_ SH2 - S02) will require relatively small particles and be
more difficult to ignite. Since detonation pressure and impulse are a
function of initial density_ much higher values can occur when both
reactants are in the condensed phase and particularly when the particles
are closely packed as they may be when they collect at the bottom or at
some other point in the interstage. It has been estimated that detonation
pressures in the order of hundreds of thousands of pounds per square
inch may result from the condensed phase detonation of hydrogen and
oxygen. Her% again_ it is understood that there is an experimental
program sponsored by George C. Marshall Space Flight Center to obtain
this information.
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IV. OCCURRENCE OF EXPLOSIONS INAN INTERSTAGE
A. Leakage of Hydrogen, Oxygen and Air
Since all vehicles will be designed with great care to prevent
accidental leakage of hydrogen_ oxygen and/or air_ the probability
of these fluids entering the interstage is difficult_ if not impossible_
to define. With the current practice of providing an inert atmosphere
in the interstage at launch 3 the leakage of any single component (H2_
02_ or air) in itself_ will not be sufficient to create an explosive
hazard. Both hydrogen and oxygen (or air) must enter the interstage
and mix before an explosion could occur.
If all of the hydrogen were contained entirely in the vehicle storage
tanks with no transfer or containment in the interstage piping 3 pumps
and valves prior to stage separation_ the probability of a hydrogen
explosion in the interstage would be remote. However_ because
satisfactory engine performance requires that the engine feed lines and
pumps be at_ or close to_ the appropriate cryogenic liquid temperatures
at start up_ all systems require the circulation of both liquid hydrogen
and oxygen through interstage components prior to stage separation. The
circulation of the propellants for inflight chill down purposes provides
the basic potential source of leakage into the interstage. With the
RL-10 engine_ the propellant transfer rate for chill down is of the order
of 1.2 Ib/sec and 1.5 ib/sec for liquid hydrogen and oxygen respectively.
This takes place during the final 10-40 seconds before stage separation.
The propellants are circulated for temperature control in the J-2 engine
continually from time of propellant filling until engine start-up. The
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rate for liquid hydrogen is approximately 1.2 pound per second. The
range of possible rates of accidental leakage of propellants into the
interstage_ then_ is from essentially no leakage at all to a level
equal to or greater than the chill down transfer rate.
The influx of air into the interstage is even more difficult to
define. With the proper design of the venting system which incorporates
a positive pressure of inert gas within the interstage 3 the probability
of air entering would be expected to be small. The loss of (or a severe
reduction in) positive pressure through accidental removal of sections
of the interstage skirt could result in failure of a mission without the
occurrence of a hydrogen-oxygen explosion.
For the purposes of this study_ the primary hazard has been assumed
to be the simultaneous leakage of both propellants. Maximum allowable
leakage rates are defined on this basis and then reviewed in terms of
air leakage into the system.
If the propellant leakage rates are small_ the relatively warm
surfaces of the engine components and interstage structure will_ along
with other convective processes 3 be sufficient to evaporate all of the
fluids 3 and only gas phase mixtures will form. With good design_ the
rate of leakage 3 if it occurs at "all_ will tend to be small. Since low
rates of escapement will then be more probable and explosions in gaseous
mixtures are more readily initiated and propagated_ gas phase reactions
appear to produce the more severe hazard. In this workj maximum
allowable leakage rates have been estimated for gaseous mixtures and then
compared with those for mixed and condensed phase reactions.
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B. Mixing of Hydrogen, Oxysen and Air
The mixing of the fluids upon entering the interstage is difficult 3
if not impossible_ to predict since the influence of interstage
geometry and the relevant thermal and diffusion processes are inordinately
complex. The extreme conditions of mixing_ however_ can be defined and
used to provide a conservative basis for predicting the explosive hazard
that may occur. For the purposes of this study_ the following three
mixing processes were considered.
Condition l--The hydrogen and oxygen leaking into the interstage
mix uniformly and instantaneously. They do not mix with the nitrogen
blanket. No hydrogen and oxygen escapes from the interstage until all
the nitrogen has been vented.
Condition 2--The hydrogen_ oxygen and nitrogen mix instantaneously
and uniformly. Hydrogen and oxygen as well as the nitrogen are lost
from the interstage as the pressure drops with altitude.
Condition 3--The hydrogen_ oxygen and nitrogen only become uniformly
mixed at the time in flight where the explosion hazard is of interest.
Prior to this time_ the mixing has been carried out in such a manner
that no hydrogen and oxygen has been lost from the interstage.
If the leakage points of each fluid are in close proximity or if
the densities of the fluids cause them to fall and mix at the bottom of
the interstage_ the conditions of item 1 above are approached. It is
understood that purging experiments conducted by the Douglas Aircraft
Company with a simulated S-IV stage have established that injected fluids
do not necessarily mix well with the inert gas in the container.
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If the leakage points are far apart and if there is considerable
turbulence_ the hydrogen and oxygen mmy mix well with the nitrogen
before they mix with each other and conditions approaching items 2 or
3 may be achieved. Condition 2 has not been utilized in this study
since it would provide a less conservative estimate of maximum leakage
rate than Condition 3.
C. Ignition Sources
There should be no sources of ignition for explosive mixtures in a
well designed vehicle interstage. Electrical components such as junction
boxes_ controls, motorsj inverters 3 etc., that may be capable of producing
sparks should be explosion proof. Adequate grounding should be provided
so that electrostatic discharges will not occur. No hot wires or surfaces
should come in contact with the atmosphere in the interstage.
In spite of precautions of this type 3 it has been demonstrated at
various hydrogen storage and handling facilities that 3 on occasion,
explosive hydrogen mixtures have been ignited. Because_ at present, it
appears impossible to predict the likelihood of an ignition source
occurring within an interstage, it is assumed, in this study, that a source
will be present at the worst time relative to the explosive hazard.
Since the strength of the source can have an influence on the
severity of the hazard, the levels of ignition energy or source temper-
(2)
ature used in the experiments made by Convair were selected for this
study. It is assumed that a well designed interstage will be incapable
of producing ignition effects more severe than these.
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D. Maximum Allowable Leakage Rates
Expressions for maximum allowable propellant leakage rates for
different explosion hazards have been developed utilizing the
assumptions given in the preceding discussion. It has been further
assumed that the leak rates will be constant and_ in most cases_ the
leakage will con_nence at lift-off since it is impossible to predict when
leakage will occur and how it may vary. The general expressions for
maximum allowable leakage rate hav% however_ been derived on the
basis of total quantity leaked at a given time. By suitable application_
it is believed that they may also be used to judge the severity of variable
leak rates.
It is expected that leak detection systems will be used as a basis
to prevent or postpone launch if propellants are escaping into the
interstage prior to lift-off. The utilization of an active nitrogen
purge up to launch should also reduce the concentration of propellants
to insignificant values when the leaks are small.
Quantitative values of maximum allowable leakage rates for the
S-IC/S-II interstage are given later as an example.
i. Maximum Allowable Rates Based on Deflasration
a. Gas Phase Mixtures
The maximum leakage rate of hydrogen and oxygen into an interstage
that can be allowed without a destructive explosion occurring as a
result of a deflagration process is evaluated on the basis of case 3 of
the mixing conditions previously discussed. The hydrogen_ oxygen and
nitrogen mixture is assumed to be uniform at any time and no hydrogen
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and oxygen that escapes into the interstage is lost by venting.
The most conservative limit appears to be a leakage rate that would
result in a concentration of hydrogen and oxygen that is just below the
flammable limit at the time when the ambient pressure is so low that the
probability of initiating deflagration (of a stoichiometric mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen) would be remote. A flammability limit of 90 percent
nitrogen and a limiting pressure for ignition of 0.15 psia were used as
a basis for this estimate.
The maximum allowable leakage rate is then defined by the total
quantity that has escaped at the time that a pressure of 0.15 psia is
achieved in flight. From the equation of state, the above values, and
an initial temperature of 530°R the maximum allowable combined (H2 + 02)
leakage is
32 x 10-6 V /_ t ib/sec _ (12)
WH 2 + 02 = o
where V = free volume of the interstage, ft 3
O
Z_t = time after start of leak to the time at which ambient
pressure = 0.15 psia, sec.
It is assumed that this is a stoichiometric mixture so that the
individual maximum allowable propellant leakage rates would be:
WH2 = 3.5 x 10 -6 Vo/ /-_ t ib/sec (13)
Wo = 28.5 x 10 -6 Vo/_ t ib/sec (14)
2
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At some altitude_ generally less than that corresponding to the
lower pressure limit (0.15 psia), the pressure increase caused by the
deflagration process will not be sufficient to damage the interstage
structure. The pressure caused by the deflagration of a stoichiometric
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen is approximately eight times the initial
pressures of the unreacted gas. If the stoichiometric mixture is diluted
with nitrogen_ the pressure caused by deflagration will also be about
eight times ambient since a smaller fraction of the available chemical
energy is tied up in dissociation reactions when the mixture is diluted.
For a pressure ratio of eight the initial pressure at which de-
flagration can no longer cause an increase in pressure that would result
in failure of the interstage structure is
P
m (15)
Po - 7
where
Po = pressure of the unreacted gas_ psia
P = maximum allowable increase in pressure resulting
m from the reaction_ psi.
The maximum allowable leakage rate is then defined as that which
will cause the total quantity of reactants_ at a time in flight when
the pressure is equal to po _ to result in a mixture that is just below
the flanmmbility limit.
Again using the equation of state, a flanmmbility limit of i0
percent (H2 + 02) and a temperature of 530°R the maximum allowable
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combined leakage rate is
WH2 P / /kt+ 02 = 30 x 10 -6 V ° m
and for the individual propellants
WH2= 3 x 10-6 V o
P I/.-_t
m
Ib/sec (16)
ib/sec (17)
W02 27 x 10 -6= VoP /_ t ib/sec (18)m
If the mixing condition listed as case i in the previous discussion
prevailed_ similar results would be obtained. The deflagration of the
stoichiometric mixture would again result in a pressure approximately
eight times ambient throughout the interstage. This would result in the
same limit as above.
If air as well as oxygen leaked into the interstage_ the leakage
rate for hydrogen_ as defined above_ would still apply. If higher
rates of leakage of hydrogen were allowed and the rate of leakage of
oxygen and/or air were controlling_ the allowable rate of oxygen
accumulation would be defined by the necessity to keep its concentration
below 5 percent at the time when the limiting ambient pressure (Po = 0.15
psia or P /7) is achieved.
m
b. Condensed Phase
Although condensed phase mixtures generally occur when the ambient
pressure is too low for them to be initiated with sources of the strength
that are probable in the interstagej the maximum allowable leak rate is
defined here as a matter of interest. It is assumed that the ambient
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_vthur _._ittlc,_nr.
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
pressure is insignificant and that the total allowable quantity leaked
must be less than that which will produce a pressure that would damage
the interstage structure. Using the equation of state and a flame
temperature of 4500°R_ the maximum combined leak rate would be
WH 2 + 02 = 249 x 10-6 Pm oV/_ t ib/sec (19)
This is much higher than the gas phase case. The periods of time
over which leakage may occur can be much greater 3 however.
2. Maximum Rates Based on Detonation
a. Gas Phase Mixtures
In the case of deflagrations_ it was assumed that the maximum
pressures produced were achieved and sustained over a sufficiently
long period to allow the use of static loading as the criterion for
structural effects. With detonation a very rapidly applied short
duration_ impulsive loading is followed by the longer duration static
loading. The effect of the impulsive loading is discussed later in the
report. It is applied here to establish maximum allowable leakage
rates. In this analysis_ it is found that the dynamic loading defines
the maximum allowable leakage rates early in flight whereas the static
loading is predominant later on. This requires that both criteria be
examined in determining the overall maximum allowable rates.
The dynamic effects have been evaluated using the mixing process
listed previously as Condition i. With the assumption that the interstage
skirt is the weakest structure (see Section V-D) and that the S-II skirt
is typical_ the radius of a "bubble" of a stoichiometric mixture
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of hydrogen and oxygen that will cause failure at a given ambient
pressure can be estimated.
This has been carried out in Section V-D where it is shownthat
the mass_M_of the stoichiometric mixture is
M 2.76 (20)
= 2
Po
where M is in pounds and Po is the ambient pressure in psi.
Using a typical trajectory as in Figure 20 for po _ M may be
calculated as a function of flight time. The maximum allowable leakage
rate is then defined by the minimum value of the ratio of total allowable
leakage (from equation 20) divided by the time. It is later shown that
in the case of the S-IC/S-II interstage_ this maximum allowable leakage
rate is less than that defined by deflagration.
If the hydrogen and oxygen were assumed to mix with the nitrogen_
more severe conditions might be imposed since_ as in the case of
deflagrations_ dilution with nitrogen may not significantly reduce the
pressures (and in this case_ impulse) produced. Lower initial
temperatures would also produce more severe loadings for an equivalent
amount leaked.
On the other hand_ only a portion of the detonable mixture will
actually detonate since the ignition sources in the interstage would
only be expected to be of sufficient intensity to initiate a deflagration.
The flame will travel some distance before the transition to detonation
takes place. The initial deflagration would not be expected to contribute
significantly to the strength of the detonation wave.
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Without more explicit knowledge of induction distances 3 it is
believed that the maximum allowable leakage rates established here are
adequate for design purposes.
b. Condensed Phase
The initiation of detonation in a dispersed mixture of condensed
phase particles of hydrogen and oxygen, as in the case of deflagration_
is improbable at pressures lower than 0.15 psia. Furthermore_ unless
the particle size is very s_ll_ a detonation wave may not propagate
through the mixture.
If the reactants collect in the form of a relatively homogeneous
mixture on a cold surfacej there is some danger of initiation by impact.
It is quite likely that the pressures resulting from a detonation of a
deposit of the two materials will be sufficient to cause failure of the
object on which they have collected. A deposit of the condensed phase,
however, requires that the surface on which it collects be precooled to
a low temperature. This requires that the fluids impinge upon the
surface at some minimum rate for a given period of time. For maximum
interstage flight times of the order of 500 seconds (e.g. Saturn), the
maximum allowable leakage rates established on the basis of gas phase
deflagrations would not appear to allow sufficient cooling of individual
surfaces to the extent that they would allow the collection of condensed
phase mixtures.
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3. Maximum Allowable Leakase Rates for S-IC/S-II Interstage
The maximum allowable leakage rates have been estimated for the
Saturn S-IC/S-II interstage to provide an example of the application of
the conclusions drawn in the preceding discussion. The free volume of
the interstage is assumed to be 15_000 feet 3 and the variation in pressure
with time of flight is that given in Figures 2 and 20. From the analysis
of the effects of explosions on interstage structures (see Section V)_
it has been concluded that the interstage skirt is the most critical
component both in terms of static and dynamic loads.
For the deflagration case 3 it is assumed that the explosion pressure
produces a static load on the structure. The limiting static pressure
differential allowed across a panel of the skirt was estimated to be
2 psi using equation (25) in Section V-B-2. This was based on the panel
being a plate 30 x 20 x 0.07 inches made of 7075-T6 aluminum with an
ultimate stress of 76_000 psi.
The maximum leakage rates were calculated using the value of 2 psi
for P in equation (16). The time for leakage was assumed to be from
m
launch until the ambient pressure was reduced to Po = Pm/7 or 0.3 psi
(ii0 seconds). The application of these values in equations (17) and
(18) results in the leakage rates given in Table V.
For the case of detonation equation (20) is plotted in Figure 23
using the data for ambient pressure as a function of time as given in
Figure 20. From this curve_ the maximum allowable rate is defined by
drawing a line that passes through the origin and tangent to the curve.
At the point of tangency_ the leak rate is defined simply as the to_lquan_
divided by the time. The resulting values are also given in Table V.
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From the preceding discussion, it is assumed that the leak rate
established for the gas phase deflagration case will also serve as a
limit for the occurrence of destructive condensed phase deflagrations.
This is also shown in Table V.
V. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Aerodynamic Loadings Due to a Detonation
In this section we deal with two general types of loading of
structures by a detonation wave: '_ind drag" and "surface impact."
The former will be experienced by a slender beamlike structure, the
latter by a wall.
These loadings have been calculated in Section Ill-B, taking for
the detonable gas a stoichiometric H2-02 mixture. The results show that
the wind drag is roughly a triangular pulse with a vertical leading edge.
To calculate the surface impact loading, we considered a spherical
container completely filled with the mixture and with the detonation
started at the center. It was found that the pressure experienced by
the wall is a triangular pulse with a vertical leading edge followed by
a constant pressure equal to about eight times the pressure of the
undetonated mixture. The results show that the duration of the wind
drag and surface impact pulses are of the order of 3 x 10-5 R.sec._ where
R is the distance in feet from the point of initiation of the detonation.
For the interstage of a launch vehicle having the configuration specified
for this study, R is of the order of 20 feet. Therefore_ the duration
of heavy transient loading of various structures in the interstage by
a detonation wave will be less than one millisecond. Preliminary
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testimates show that the fundamental natural period of vibration of
various beamlike and platelike structures in a typical interstage are
much greater than one millisecond. Therefore, for all practical
purposes the _I_--_,_ of a detonation wave on these structures is
impulsive. The strength of the pressure impulse P (psi-sec) is given
by the following expressions: for wind drag
RC
Po D
P = 0.0317 T (21)
o
and for surface impact
Po R
P = 0.393 T (22)
o
where
Po = the pressure of the undetonated mixture (psi)
T = the temperature of the undetonated mixture (OR)
o
R = the distance from the point of initiation of the
detonation (feet)
CD = the drag coefficient of a beamlike structure
These equations can be easily derived from equations (9) and (ii)
by expressing the density of the mixture in terms of its temperature
and pressure through the equation of state. It should be emphasized that
equation (22) gives the pressure impulse on the wall of a spherical
enclosure completely filled with the detonable mixture and with the
detonation started at the center. We believe that this formula is a
good approximation to the pressure impulse experienced by a platelike
structure placed normal to the direction of travel of the detonation
wave 3 provided that the radius of curvature of the structure is comparable
to R. This is not a very restrictive condition for various structures
71
_¢thur _._Rtle,_m'.
of a typical interstage. However 3 this formula is not applicable to
conelike or wedgelike concave structures which exist in an interstage.
The present analysis is_ therefore 3 confined to beamlike and almost-flat
structures. The detonation wave is assumed normal to the structure.
B. Stresses in Interstage Structural Elements
i. Dynamic Maximum Bendin$ Stress in Beams and Plates
The typical interstage structures considered here are beams and
plates under the uniform impulsive loadings given in the preceding
Section. The response of the structures can_ in principle_ be expressed
as an infinite series of their natural modes of vibration with time-
dependent coefficients. For beams these coefficients can always be
computed exactly. For plates this cannot be done except for certain edge
conditions. In addition to this difficulty_ the computation of the
maximum bending stress from such a series is an extremely tedious task
(since the loading is impulsive 3 more than just the first mode of
vibration must be considered). Therefore_ we have developed the
following approximate and very simple analysis.
When a uniform impulsive load acts on a structure of given mass
initially at restj the structure acquires instantaneously a certain amount
of kinetic energy. From then on_ the structure vibrates converting kinetic
energy into strain energy and vice versa. If there are no losses_ the
structure will vibrate continuously. Our approximate analysis is based
on the following three assumptions:
I. The bending moment (and bending stress) is maximum when
the strain energy is maximum.
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2. When the strain energy is nmximum_ the kinetic energy
is equal to zero.
2. When the strain energy is maximum_ the response of the
structure is the same as that due to a ---_u**_o_,_s aeic_.
load which produces the same amount of strain energy.
The procedure is demonstrated step by step in Appendix C. The
results for uniform beams and rectangular plates are given below. In
Appendix D the results are compared with those of some possible exact
solutions 3 and it is shown that they are fairly acceptable.
Beams -- For uniform beams of steel or aluminum, the uniform
impulsive wind drag loading given by equation (21) produces the following
maximum bending stress O--max (psi) :
a--max = 2240 Y bhp°RCD
T _ (23)
O
where _ is a constant equal to 1.94 for simply supported beams and
3.16 for clamped or cantilever beams_ and
b = the width of the cross-section of the beam (in)
h = the depth of the cross-section of the beam (in)
S = the cross-sectional area of the beam (in 2)
I = the area moment of inertia of the cross-section of the beam (in4).
The units of the variables Po" R and T are psia_ feet_ and °R_o
respectively. For beams with circular cross-section the drag coefficient
CD is equal to 1.4 (supersonic flow).
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Plates -- For uniform rectangular plates of steel or aluminum_
the uniform impulsive surface impact loading given by equation (22)
produces a maximum bending stress 0- max (psi) given by:
= 2.48 x 105 _ Po R (24)
0-max F_'o_-h T
O
where h is the thickness of the plate in inches_ and n_ are
functions of the ratio of the sides (taken always greater than i) and of
the edge conditions. Values of _ and _ can be taken directly from
gables in reference (34). Two such tablesj pertaining to rectangular
plates with all four edges either simply supported or clamped_ are
reproduced in Table VI.
2. Static Maximum Bending Stress in Plates
In a container completely filled with a stoichiometric mixture of
hydrogen and oxygenj the static pressure after detonation may be as
great as eight times the pressure before detonation. Hence_ a portion
of the enclosure 3 which can be considered as a rectangularj flat plate 3
will be loaded with a uniform static pressure equal to 7 Po where Po
is the pressure before detonation. The pressure outside the container
has been taken equal to Po" The maximum bending stress _max (psi)
due to this loading is given by:
2
= 42 _ Po a (25)
_- max h 2
where a and h are the smaller side and thickness of the plate in inches.
The units of Po are psi. The variable_ is a function of the ratio of
the sides and of the edge conditions as defined in Section V-B-I.
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TABLE Vl
VALUES OF THE PARAMETERS _ AND _ FOR RECTANGULAR
PLATES WITH ALL EDGES EITHER SIMPLY SUPPORTED OR
CLAMPED, POISSON's RATIO EQUAL TO 0.3 Ref. (34)
Ratio of Simply Supported Clamped
Sides _/ _ _
1.0
i.i
1°2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
0.00406 0.0479
0.00485 0.0554
0.00564 0.0627
0.00638 0.0694
0.00705 0.0755
0.00772 0o0812
0.00830 0.0862
0.00883 0.0908
0.00931 0°0948
0.00974 0.0985
0.01013 0.1017
0.01223 0.1189
0.01282 0.1235
0.01297 0.1246
0°01302 0.1250
0.00126 0.0513
0.00150 0o0581
0.00172 0.0639
0.00191 0.0687
0.00207 0.0726
0.00220 0.0757
0.00230 0°0780
0°00238 0°0799
0.00245 0.0812
0.00249 0.0822
0.00254 0.0829
0.00260 0o0833
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C. Typical Interstage Components
i. Loads on the Interstage
Major components within the interstage are subjected to severe
thrust, aerodynamic, and acoustic loadings during the boost phase.
A gas-phase detonation within the interstage during the boost phase
will be superimposed on the three major loads and structural failure
may result at a level which is much lower than would be expected of an
unloaded structure. A load factor must be determined for each structure
which is based on the ultimate strength of the structure and the load
environment. On the other hand, some structural elements can be
considered unloaded_ for all practical purposes, when detonation effects
are examined.
a. Design Load Factors
George Marshall Space Flight Center's specifications for boosters
(35)
have a factor of safety of i.i based on yield and 1.4 based on
ultimate strength. For most tempered materials (7075-T6 aluminum), the
factor of safety based on the ultimate strength is commonly used.
b. The Load Environment
For a typical manned space vehicle with one or more interstages, a
typical launch profile would be composed as follows:
Lift-off
Maximum aerodynamic load (Max Q)
First stage burnout
Second stage ignition
Second stage burnout
1.25 g
2.08 g
4.68 g
0. 726 g
2.24 g
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The sustained thrust loads on the interstages will be maximum at
first stage burnout. However_ at Max Q the combination of the sustained
acceleration and the aerodynamic excitation may create the worst vibratory
_ _ _.stress ....d ....... The aerodynamic loads may be applied locally as the
result of boundary layer or near acoustic field effects. They also may
take the form of gross bending of the missile as a free beam as the
result of wind shear. Bending loads are also applied as a reaction to
the engine control system. Realistic design practice limits the possibility
of two '_orst case" loads occurring simultaneously. Therefore_ the stress
state of a structure when a detonation occurs may be determined from one
load condition (we suggest axial acceleration). The possibility that
a detonation will occur_ for instance_ when a maximum wind shear is en-
countered is negligible.
c. Stress Required to Failure
For the purpose of this analysis_ we shall assume that the interstage
thrust structure is fully stressed to 71.5% of the ultimate stress (factor
of safety of 1.4) during the period between Max Q and first stage burnout.
(See Figure 15). This premise is generally checked by reference (36).
The stress which will cause failure is the difference between the ultimate
and the developed stress under load. This "failure" stress state is
taken as the difference between the design factor of safety (1.4) and
the stress factor (Figure 15) times the allowable stress. This relationship
has been plotted on Figure 16 for Aluminum 7075-T6_ which has an
ultimate stress of 76_000 psi (37).
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We acknowledge that this'_ailure" stress is only an approximate
method of determining the loads which will cause structural failure in
an interstage. We believe that this failure criterion is consistent
with the accuracy of existing linear dynamic stress analysis techniques,
however.
2. Arrangement of Components
In a typical hydrogen fueled upper stage of a launch vehicle, the
much larger liquid hydrogen storage tank is placed above the tank for
liquid oxygen. The interstage necessarily has a diameter as large as that
of the tanks of the upper stage and will be tapered to match the diameter
of the lower stage if it is larger. The length of the interstage is
defined by the length of the engine nozzle and its associated thrust
structure. In many present designs, doubled jacketed, flexibly supported
hydrogen feed lines do not penetrate the oxidizer tank but are taken
outside of the liquid oxygen tank and re-enter the interstage at the
thrust structure-skirt intersection.
Two typical interstage sections (a "middle stage" and an "upper
stage") are shown on Figures 17 and 18. These interstages are general
models of the North American Saturn S-II stage and the Douglas Aircraft
Company Saturn SlVB stage. Both interstages are representative of a
wide variety of structural components, skirt geometries, engine mountings,
even though the stages are integral parts of the Saturn V system. The
stages are of different diameter, have different volume surface areas,
yet us a semi-monocoque thrust structure and the NAA Rocketdyne J-2
engine. General resemblance ends with the latter two components.
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3. Structural Elements of the Interstage
The structural components or elements within the interstage which
are most susceptible to damage by a gas-phase detonation wave are noted
numerically on Figures 17 and 18.
a. Interstase Skirt
The interstage skirt must carry the axial acceleration loads during
lower stage boost and must withstand bending loads generated by aerodynamic
forces (usually wind shear) and the resultant engine control system
reaction. These bending moments may be noted generally in the first
few modes of the missile which acts as a free-free beam. To carry these
loads, skirts are generally composed of longitudinal stringers, hoop
frames_ and a thin skin.
The skin will be subjected to the most damage by an interstage
detonation as its dimensions normal to the shock front are large (see
Figure 19). The detonation loading will be a diffraction shock
uniformly distributed over the surface of an equivalent flat plate.
Prior to detonation_ the hoop forces are small, sufficient only to
prevent the heavily loaded longitudinal stringers from buckling. The
skin does not carry thrust or bending loads--only the acoustic and
aerodynamic loads--the magnitude of which is most difficult to define.
For this analysis_ we shall consider the frames and stringers to carry
the load during launch and the skin is unstressed.
For skirt designs which have no hoop frames 3 the skin will have
small hoop forces to restrain the stringers. For this analysis, we
consider the hoop forces to be small in comparison with the pressure
stresses.
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The cylindrical skirt in the middle stage is subjected to external
pressures caused by gusts and wind shear. To reduce the buckling under
these loads_ the interstage is semi-sealed and the expanding air (or
inert purge gas) _= progran_ned to have a i or 2 psi pressure drop across
the skin.
The loss of a portion of the conical skirt will abort the mission
as the skirt will collapse if the internal pressure falls below a safe
level. The cylindrical stage is less susceptible to damage if the
interstage pressure is lost. Damage could occur due to high drag
effects or the thrust structure could be buckled by high wind shears or
gusts.
The unstressed skin of the middle stage skirt can be represented
by a flat plate with the edges fixed. Fixing the edges of the plate
will cause high bending stresses at the boundaries and yielding will
occur. Thus_ a stress condition within the flat plate model will result
which is between that of a simply supported plate and a fixed edge
restraint. Substituting in equation (24)--see Appendix E for details--
we can obtain the relationship (for T
O
= 500°R)
R = 6.65/p ° (26)
where R is the distance in feet over which a spherical detonation wave
must travel to be of sufficient intensity to cause a tensile rupture in
the flat plate. Po is the pressure in psi at a given time or altitude
during the launch. The dimensions for the plate are taken from Figure
19. Figure 20 shows a typical ambient pressure history.
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Referring to Figure 20_ note that_ about 120 sec after lift-off_
R exceeds the maximum 2nd stage diameter of 33 ft (Saturn V). Thereforej
beyond that time_ the interstage skirt can withstand the detonation
blast load--even if the interstage is completely filled with a detonable
gaseous hydrogen-oxygen mixture.
b. The Rocket Engine
The combustion chamber and the nozzle throat are designed to
withstand internal pressure loads. The expansion cone of the nozzle
is also designed to withstand a pressure differential that is close to
atmospheric since this will occur during sea level static firings. It
appears that the engine and nozzle will be damaged by diffraction loading
only when the strong detonation waves resulting from a large leakage
occur near ground level. The reaction of the drag loading on the
expansion cone caused by a detonation wave would not be expected to be
damaging since the engines are designed to withstand large overturning
moments.
Because of the relative fragility of other components within the
interstage_ and the central location of the nozzle (which may result in
a higher probability of being close to the source of the detonation)_
we believe that the engine ismt a critical component.
c. The Base Heat Shield
The heat shield in multi-engine installations prevents gas
circulation and radiant heating of the liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen feed lines and other temperature sensitive components in the
pump section of the rocket engine. The heat shield is a light structure
of laminated construction (aluminum or fiberglass covered honeycomb)
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which is simply supported from the thrust ring. Since the outer engines
are movable, flexible boots are required between the engine nozzles
and the main section of the heat shield.
As the design loads on the heat shield are minimal (i.e. a relatively
low distributed stagnation pressure and small inertia loads), the
structure and the support system are comparatively weak. The shield,
therefore 3 is susceptible to damage from the detonation wave. The
shield can be modeled as a simply supported flat plate (Figure 21) and
is subjected to a normal diffraction shock. Because the plate is of
laminated construction 3 an effective uniform plate thickness must be
used in equation (24). When this is donej the following result is
obtained:
R = 14.9_ (27)
o
R and Po are as defined in Section V-C-3-a.
Conversely, as the loadings on the structure are normally small,
the heat shield can be easily strengthened to have the same blast
resistance as the next weak link in the interstage structural chain.
The flexible boots, of course 3 will be carried away by the mass movement
of the combustion products. It is understood that the mission may be
aborted if these membrane-like boots are ruptured.
d. Engine Thrust Structure
Engine thrust loads during stage ignition and operation are
transferrred to the outer tank wall and ultimately to the upper stages
by a conical frame-stringer structure below the oxidizer tank. For
multiple engine installations, the conical section is truncated near the
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apex and a circular thrust ring distributes the individual engine thrust
loads. Usually a spider thrust beam is used to transfer the center
engine thrust to the thrust ring. Single engine stages mount the engine
near the apex. The thrust cone usually is covered with a skin which
may be stressed during engine firing but will be unstressed when gas
phase detonations are a hazard.
If such a detonation occurs on either side of the thrust cone_ the
skin will be damaged. For low frontal area components such as the
center engine thrust beam_ the primary load will be a gust-like drag
load.
Prior to stage separation_ the tensile inertia loads of the engine
will be the principle load on the structure. However_ if blast loads
were severe enough to permanently deform the center engine thrust beam
or a portion of the conical structure_ then buckling might occur during
stage ignition. The dynamic stress analysis considers the cone to be
impulsive loaded and to be represented by a fixed plate. The center
engine thrust beam experiences drag loads.
Calculations show that the center engine thrust beam will be
unaffected by detonations that would cause severe damage to the skin.
The dimensions of a flat plate representing the skin are similar to the
skirt panel and therefore the relationship that defines the loading
caused by a detonation wave is similar.
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e. Propellant Feed Lines
The hydrogen feed lines (nine inch OD for Saturn V) are double
jacketed and simply supported due to the flexibility of the bellows
joints that are necessary to acco_m_odate thermal strains. The fuel
lines extend into the interstage structure and are supported by the
conical thrust structure. The lines are subjected to intense_ airborne
vibration loads during engine firing; however 3 the excitation is at
high frequencies and therefore the overpressures are small. The lines
whose frontal area dimensions are small will be loaded as beams exposed
to gust loads.
The liquid oxygen lines are of the same general diameter as the
liquid hydrogen lines except that the doubling jackets are omitted.
The lines will be flexible due to the expansion joints_ however_ the
length of the lines are small due to the proximity of the liquid
oxygen tank. In estimating the stresses caused by a detonation wave_
sections of the hydrogen and oxygen feed lines were considered as
simply supported beams 150 inches long (see Figure 22). The diameter
and thickness of these circular pipes are 8 and 0.025 inches_ respectively.
The stress allowed for detonation effects is taken equal to 25_000 psi
(one-fourth the ultimate strength of stainless steel). With T o = 500°R_
the following relationship between R and Po is computed in Appendix E.
56.8
R - (28)
Po
where R and Po are as defined in Section V-C-3-a.
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f. Interstate Conditionin_ Manifold
The purge system has a plastic manifold which distributes the
purge flow (gaseous nitrogen or air) during prelaunch operations. The
plastic is designed to subli_mte at 600°F in the S-II interstage and
will evaporate during stage burning. The loss of the air-conditioning
manifold due to a detonation or a deflagration will not in itself abort
the launch--the manifold is not considered a critical component.
g. The Liquid Oxygen Tank Head
The bottom of the liquid oxygen tank (spheroid head) comprises the
upper boundary of the interstage compartment. The head will be subjected
to internal pressures which are equal to the dynamic head of the oxidizer
during boost plus any ullage pressurization. Normally the tank design
pressure is between 20 and 40 psi. The head_ therefore_ is pressure
stiffened and an intense diffraction shock of slightly greater magnitude
will be necessary to rupture the head. The oxidizer tank wall will
withstand impulsive loadings far greater than other components within
the interstage and is not considered critical.
D. Minimum Mass of Detonable Mixture
Comparing equations (26) to (28)_ we see that the most critical
structure of the S-IC/S-II interstage of Saturn V is the interstage
skirt (the skirt of the engine thrust structure is almost as critical).
Equation (26) gives the minimum radius of a "bubble" of a stoichiometric
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen which will fail the skirt_ when it is
placed next to the skirt and is detonated. The maximum allowable weight
of stoichiometric mixture was then estimated as follows.
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From the equation of state, the pressure of the mixture before
detonation is :
T/_o o
Po = 1545 M.W. (29)
where Po = pressure_ psf
= density_ ibs/ft 3
T = temperature, OR
o
The mean molecular weight (M.W.) of a H 2 - 02 stoichiometric mixture is
equal to 12.
The total mass M of the stoichiometric mixture before detonation
in a spherical bubble of radius R is given by:
R 3M= 47 #o
3
(30)
Substituting for _) from equation (29) and for R from equation (26)
and assuming a temperature of 500°R_ the following expression for M is
obtained :
where
2.76
M= 2
Po
M = weight of stoichiometric mixture, ibs
(20)
Po = pressure, psi
With Po as given in the typical flight of Figure 20, M versus
flight-time has been plotted in Figure 23. This curve gives an estimate
of the mmximummass of detonable H 2 - 02 stoichiometric mixture versus
flight-time, which can be tolerated in this interstage.
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Vl. METHODS OF PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF EXPLOSIONS
A. System-Requirements for Inert Gas Purgin_
i. Discussion
The formation of combustible mixtures of propellant gases within
the interstage compartment of a rocket vehicle can be prevented or
minimized by continuous purging of the compartment with an inert gas.
The mechanism by which combustible mixtures are eliminated differs
with the flow rate of the purge gas and the manner in which it is
injected. Three distinct flow conditions within the compartment
can be considered:
i. Well-Stirred Condition
2. Streaming Condition
3. Natural Convection Condition
The well-stirred condition results from injection of the purge
gas in a manner which promotes mixing so that a nearly uniform mixture
is obtained throughout the compartment. The rate of injection must
be sufficient to insure that the mixture is not combustible. If this
condition can be achieved, it will be very effective in eliminating
hazards. However, the required purge gas flow rates may be excessive.
The streaming condition results from injection of the purge gas
in a manner which minimizes mixing, but establishes a smooth flow
of gas between the injection point and the vent location. The objec-
tive of this type of system would be to create a sweeping action
throughout the compartment to remove propellant vapors before any
substantial degree of mixing could occur.
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The natural convection condition is established by providing
either a low or high density atmosphere within the compartment so that
leaking propellant vapors are carried to the vent location by the
effects of gravity and vehicle acceleration. With this approach, the
need for purging during flight would be eliminated. However, it is
unlikely that combustible mixtures can be avoided completely under
this condition.
2. Purging Fluids
a. Properties
The effectiveness of a purge gas in eliminating hazards is related
to a number of its physical properties. The property of primary
interest is its density or molecular weight. In most of the purging
methods, a low density is desirable, though the reasons for desiring
a low density vary among the methods.
A second property of importance is the vapor pressure of the purge
gas. Its vapor pressure must be sufficiently high so that the gas does
not condense on cold surfaces within the compartment. Potential con-
densation sites include the propellant feed lines and the compartment
walls at high altitudes.
b. Suitable Fluids
(i) Gas or Liquid Storage
Materials which could be employed as purging fluids are listed in
Table VII with values of pertinent physical properties. Two categories
of fluids are indicated--those stored as compressed gases and those
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Material
TABLE Vll
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF PURGING FLUIDS
Gaseous Storage
Material Mol. Wt.
H 4
e
H 2 2
N 2 28
CH 4 16
Mol. Wto
Liquid Storage (20C)
Liquid N.B.P. Storage
Density (Oc) Pressure
(ib/ft 3) (atm)
CO 2 44 48 -78.5 60
N20 44 50 -88.5 50
C2H 6 30 35 -88°6 40
CH3F 34 55 -78.2 40
NH 3 17 38 -33.4 I0
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stored as liquids. Liquid storage offers the advantage of reduced
tank volume and weight. However, a distinct disadvantage in the use
of a liquid is the necessity of an energy source to supply the heat of
vaporization of the liquid. Unless an existing source of energy were
utilized, this requirement could negate the saving in tank weight
accompanying liquid storage.
Materials listed in Table VII have been limited to low molecular
weight fluids which will not condense at -55°C and a pressure of 1/4
atmosphere. This condition is encountered at approximately 35,000
feet altitude in a standard atmosphere and is the worst condition
encountered from the standpoint of condensation on the external panels
of the vehicle. A similar criterion cannot be established for conden-
sation on propellant passages unless the degree of precooling of the
engines is known. If the engines are to be precooled to propellant
storage temperatures, consideration of purging fluids will be limited
to light gases.
(2) Gas Generator Systems
As an alternative to a gas or liquid storage system, a gas
generator could be utilized as a source of gas for purging interstage
compartments. A wide variety of either solid or liquid generating
materials could be used, depending upon the desired properties of the
purge gas. It would be expected, however, that the combined weight
of the propellant storage vessel and combustor would be of the order
of 20 to 30 per cent of the propellant weight. Solid propellant gas
99
(38)
generators available commercially reportedly produce gaseous products
with an average molecular weight as low as 22 and temperatures ap-
proaching 100C.
3. Storage Vessels
In analyzing the requirements of vessels for storage of gas for
purging interstage compartments, it is assumed that spherical shapes
can be employed and that construction materials can be utilized at
their maximum practical working stresses. The required thickness of
a spherical tank can be expressed as:
t = ed (31)
4S
where P = internal pressure
d = diameter
S = stress
The weight and volume of the tank are as follows:
WT = /]7pTTtd2
VT = _3
(32)
(33)
where _ T : tank density
By combining Equations (31), (32), and (33) an expression is
obtained for the ratio of tank weight to fluid weight where/_F = fluid
density :
WT WT 3 _T P
WF pFVT 2 S F F
(34)
i00
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In the case of liquid storage, P becomes the vapor pressure of
the liquid and _F the liquid density, both of which remain constant
if the temperature is fixed. In the case of a compressed gas which
can be treated as a perfect gas, Equation (34 can be written:
WT_ 3 _T RT (35)
WF 2 S M
where R = universal gas constant
T = temperature
M = molecular weight of gas
Thus, in either case, it is observed that the ratio of tank weight to
fluid weight is independent of the tank size, quantity of fluid, or
in the case of a compressed gas, the tank pressure. Consequently,
the tank weight can be related directly to the fluid weight and this
relationship is independent of total quantity of fluid. Similar rela-
tions can be written for cylindrical or toroidal tanks. In these
cases, the tank weight is increased by a factor of 4/3.
The critical tank property affecting its weight is the ratio
S/ _T' sometimes referred to as "specific strength." Values of
specific strength, based on ultimate tensile strength, are listed in
Table VIII for materials currently used in high pressure storage
vessels. For purposes of this analysis, a specific strength of
0.8 x 106 ibf in/Ibm is assumed which provides a safety factor of 1.5
with titanium or 2.4 with fiberglass reinforced plastic. Using this
value in Equations (34) and (35_ ratios of tank weight to fluid
i01
TABLE VIII
SPECIFIC STRENGTH OF TANK MATERIALS
Material Ultimate Density
Strength (ibm/in 3 )
(psi)
Glass Fiber and
Binder
150,000 .079
Titanium
Steel
Aluminum
200,000 .162
250,000 .278
75,000 .097
102
Specific Strength
(SI_)
(ibf in/ibm)
1.9 x 106
1.2 x 106
0.9 x 106
0.8 x 106
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weight for typical fluids have been determined and are listed in
Table IX.
In the case of light gases, such as hydrogen and helium, the tank
weight is considerably greater than that of the gas. Whereas, with
heavier gases such as nitrogen, the tmnk and fluid weights are
comparable, and with liquid storage system, the tank weight is an
insignificant portion of the system weight.
4. Purging Techniques
a. Well-Stirred System
The operation of a well-stirred purging system is based upon the
rapid mixing of the purging fluid with other gases in the compartment
so that combustible mixtures cannot accumulate in any appreciable
volume. The effectiveness of the system is dependent upon the rate
of mixing and the degree of mixing which is achieved. In addition to
the rate of injection of purging fluid, mixing effectiveness will be
influenced by the relative locations of injection points, leak points,
and vents, and by the velocity and orientation of the streams of
purging fluid.
With regard to relative positioning, the location of the vents
often is dictated by considerations other than combustion hazards.
The locations of leaks cannot be controlled, but the most likely leak
sites can be designated. Therefore, only the purging fluid injection
points can be located independently. These injection points should
be located in the vicinity of the potential leak points so that contact
103
_Irtbur l}.Iit_le,_nc.
TABLE IX
RATIO OF TANK WEIGHT TO FLUID WEIGHT
Fluid WT/W F
Spherical Tank Cylindrical Tank
Hydrogen 9.0 12.0
Helium 4.5 6.0
Nitrogen 0.65 0.87
Carbon Dioxide 0°06 0°08
(Liquid)
Specific strength (S/_) of tank material = 0.8 x 106 ibf/in/ibm
104
_[rthur _l.Rittie._J,tr.
!
!
!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
between the leaking propellants and the purging fluid is established
quickly.
Orientation of purging fluid jets should be such that no ordered
flow pattern is produced within the compartment. Instead, the initial
energy of the jets should be allowed to dissipate through turbulence,
resulting in a random flow pattern in which mixing is enhanced. In
order to obtain the maximum amount of turbulent mixing, the fluid
injection velocity should be as high as possible without creating
damaging impingement loads on structures within the compartment.
If reasonably complete mixing is achieved, the concentration of
propellant vapor within the compartment will be uniform, except in
the irmnediate vicinity of the leak point. Early in the launch period,
the concentration will vary according to the following relationship,
assuming that the volumetric flow rates of propellant and diluent
where A
(purging fluid) are constant:
-t -t
A A V
Vp = Vpoe + (i - e _ . .P
Vd + Vp
= V/(V d +Vp)
= volume fraction of propellant vaporv
P
v
po
V d
V
P
= initial volume fraction of propellant
= volumetric flow rate of diluent
= volumetric flow rate of propellant
(36)
I05
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V = compartment volume
t = time
If the time constant A is small compared to the time period during
which combustion hazards are apt to occur, the propellant concentration
will approach a steady value quickly which can be described simply:
v
P
V
_ P (37)
V d + Vp
If the well-stirred purging method is employed, this condition
will prevail since the flow rate of diluent will be large in order to
avoid combustible mixtures. The diluent flow rate will be much greater
than the propellant leak rate and can be written as:
• V (38)
V d = _2____
v
pm
where v = maximum propellant concentration (volumetric).
pm
In terms of mass flow rates, the rate of diluent injection can be
written as follows, assuming that the temperature of the propellant
vapor is raised to that of the diluent during mixing:
w M dP
Wd --
v M
pm p
(39)
where M d = molecular weight of diluent
M = molecular weight of propellant
P
In the case of hydrogen, v is equal to 0.04 which is the lower
pm
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flammability limit for this material. In the case of oxygen, the
maximum concentration is 0.05 in the presence of hydrogen. The
volumetric flow rate of diluent required is shown in Figure 24 as a
function of propellant leak rate for dilution with helium or nitrogen.
The tank weights for compressed gas storage as a function of volu-
metric flow rate of diluent (for a period of i00 seconds) is given
in Figure 25. The combined weight of the purging fluid and storage
tank is shown in Figure 26 . For comparison purposes, it is estimated
that the weight of a solid propellant gas generator would approach
that required by the nitrogen purge system.
If the maximum propellant leak rate can be estimated, the purging
system weight can be determined from Figure 26, assuming that the
weight of incidental equipment (valves, controls, etc.) is negligible.
It may be concluded that the well-stirred purging approach involves a
weight penalty which may be high. If it is intolerably high, then the
information presented here will form a reference in order to evaluate
the effectiveness of other approaches to the problem.
b. Streamin_ System
In contrast to a well-stirred purging system, the operation of
a streaming system is based upon the minimization of mixing of a
leaking propellant with either the diluent or other propellants, and
the rapid transport of propellant vapors to the vent locations. To
be effective, the system requires an ordered flow pattern within the
107
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compartment and a low level of turbulence. If full advantage is taken
of the relative positions of leak points and vent locations, and of
buoyancy effects, the system should be more economical in terms of
purging fluid requirements than the well-stirred approach.
The design of a streaming system must be based on the particular
compartment configuration and the location of potential leaks. Only
a few general remarks can be stated concerning the principles involved.
In general, the diluent should be injected at low velocity, and
possibly at a large number of points to establish the desired flow
pattern. Buoyancy effects will differ depending upon the purging
fluid used, and their analysis is complicated by differences in temper-
ature. For example, if helium is used as a purging fluid, leaking
hydrogen will be negatively buoyant initially and will become posi-
tively buoyant as its temperature rises. In this situation, it
probably would be best to ignore hydrogen leakage and concentrate
upon oxygen removal since the buoyancy of oxygen will be strongly
negative at all times. This approach would require the vents to be
located near the lower end of the compartment.
It would be difficult to estimate the quantity of purging fluid
required with this type of system. The most reliable approach to
determining the effectiveness of streaming in preventing combustible
mixtures would be through the use of an experimental program. A
model of the interstage compartment with appropriate gas-sampling
devices could be used to establish the purging system design.
iii
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c. Convection System
The convection purging system is simply an extension of the
streaming system where buoyancy effects alone are relied upon to
remove propellant vapors. The approach is based upon flushing the
compartment with a diluent prior to launching so that the initial
propellant concentration is low. Through proper diluent selection and
vent location, at least one of the propellants can be removed from the
compartment. The primary mechanism of removal would be the differen-
tial effects of gravity and vehicle acceleration. However, the effect
of decreasing pressure with altitude also would provide some sweeping
action due to removal of diluent.
If helium were used as the diluent, oxygen would drop rapidly to
the bottom of the compartment where it could be vented outboard.
However, the accumulation of hydrogen at the top of the compartment
might progress to the point where oxygen was leaking directly into a
hydrogen atmosphere. This condition would be undesirable.
Alternatively, a heavy diluent fluid could be employed which
would cause hydrogen to leave the top of the compartment. In this case,
oxygen might accumulate near the bottom, but, in this position, it
would not be in the vicinity of potential hydrogen leak points. In
addition, the volumetric leak rate of oxygen is likely to be less than
that of hydrogen.
The convective approach obviously would involve less of a weight
penalty than purging techniques involving the use of storage fluids.
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However, its effectiveness is questionable and could be established
only by experiment. It would appear desirable to rely on convective
purging only in instances where no additional weight can be tolerated.
B. Analysis of Aerodynamic Purging of Rocket Engine Components
i. Discussion
Aerodynamic purging of an engine compartment of a multistage
rocket vehicle can be utilized to reduce explosion hazards due to
propellant leakage. The mechanism by which hazards are reduced is the
dilution of fuel vapors to concentrations below the lower or lean
limit of flammability. With this mechanism, the leakage of oxidizer
vapors contributes to the dilution process and does not create an
additional hazard.
The analysis of the effectiveness of aerodynamic purging is
difficult except under certain simplified conditions. The simplest
condition to evaluate is the well-stirred case wherein the purging
air is distributed throughout the compartment and the concentration
of fuel vapor is uniform. This case is idealized but not unrealistic.
If aerodynamic purging were utilized, the well-stlrred condition
would be desirable and effort should be directed toward achieving this
condition. Otherwise, the accumulation of fuel vapor and the develop
ment of hazards would be dependent upon location of leaks and local
flow conditions. If the location of a fuel leak is uncertain, aero-
dynamic purging cannot be depended upon to eliminate a hazard in an
unstirred condition.
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Therefore, it appears that a brief analysis of aerodynamic purging
of a well-stirred compartment would be useful to establish the require-
ments and limitations of this approach to hazard reduction. In the
analysis which follows, the following assumptions are made:
a. The volumetric influx of air is sufficient to replace the
fluid in the compartment in a time which is short compared to the
operating time of the rocket.
b. Incoming air is distributed such that the concentration
of fuel vapor is uniform throughout the compartment.
c. The volumetric rate of fuel leakage is small compared to
the volumetric influx of air.
d. The temperature of the fuel vapor is equal to that of
the incoming air.
2. Analysis of Well-Stirred Case
Under the conditions stated above, the fuel concentration in the
compartment will vary with time as follows:
dvf = i (Vf - Ve) (40)
dt V
where vf = volumetric fraction of fuel concentration
Vf = volumetric fuel leakage rate
V = volumetric exhaust rate
e
V = volume of engine compartment
t = time
114
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The volumetric exhaust rate can be expressed as:
• " " d i
V = V + Vf -/V _ -- (41)
e a /o
where V = volumetric air intake rate
a
/_= density
Under the assumption of a high purging rate, the last term of equation
(41), which results from the change of pressure with altitude, is
small compared with other terms of the equation.
Equation (40) then can be written as:
dVf + i " _ Vf (42)
dt _ (Va + VE) %/f - _-
and the solution of this equation is:
Equation (43) can be simplified if the air and fuel flow rates can
be expressed as functions of time. For this purpose, it is assumed
that air is introduced into the compartment through scoops and the
volumetric flow rate can be described as:
V = aAU (44)
a
where a = scoop effectiveness
A = scoop frontal area
U = flight velocity
where "a" is a constant accounting for failure of the scoop to capture
an air stream equivalent to AU, and for reduction of the air velocity
I15
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in the boundary layer of the vehicle.
The programmed flight velocity of a typical vehicle is plotted
in Figure 27 and can be expressed approximately as:
1.5
U =CI t
where C1 = 1.8 ft/sec 2"5
Therefore, the air flow rate can be written:
where C2 = CI aA
(45)
= C a A t1"5 = C2 t 1"5 (46)Va i
The fuel flow rate, on the other hand, cannot be represented by
a simple expression. Assuming that the mass rate of fuel leakage
remains constant, the volumetric flow rate will increase with altitude.
However, during the initial period of flight, the rate of change of
density of fuel vapor will be low, and, as will be shown below, the
time dependent terms in equation (43) are important only during the
initial period. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis it is justi-
fiable to assume that both the mass and volumetric fuel flow rates are
constant.
Making use of equation (45), equation (43) can be reduced to the
fo ilowing:
.
• iv:I:,,_:,,:o_x,L--lv_:_+v_),,v + __x,-I _ vO:_
where Vfo = initial fuel concentration (volume fraction)
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The first term on the right of equation (47) represents the
sweeping away of the fuel vapor present at time zero. If the fuel
leakage rate is zero, this term indicates the decay of fuel concen-
tration with time. However, if a finite fuel leakage rate exists,
the second term dominates after a short period of time.
soon as the air flow rate becomes substantial, that is:
V a >> Vf (48)
and
Vt
a _2.5
V
then the fuel concentration reduces simply to the ratio of the flow
rates of fuel to air, as might be expected intuitively:
In fact, as
___Vf%[ _ __ (49)
f
V
a
The volumetric fuel flow rate can be expressed in terms of the
mass leakage rate as follows:
Wf R T
Vf = p Mf (50)
where Mf = molecular weight of fuel
Wf = weight rate of fuel leakage
R = gas constant
T = temperature
P = pressure
118
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so that by combining equations (44), (49), and (50), the following
expression is obtained for fuel concentration during flight:
V "_: R Wf mT (57).
f a A Mf PU
With a constant mass rate of fuel leakage, it is observed that
fuel concentration varies with the factor T/PU. The variation of this
factor for a typical _ehicle launched through a standard atmosphere is
indicated in Figure 28, which shows the variation of fuel concentration
with altitude. The concentration remains relatively constant at alt_
tudes between I0,000 and 30,000 feet. At lower altitudes, the concem
tration may be higher or lower, depending upon the concentration at
time zero. At higher altitudes, the concentration rises rapidly, indi-
cating a reduction in effectiveness of aerodynamic purging.
The scoop area required to achieve adequate purging can be calcu-
lated by rearranging equation (51) as follows:
A -J RT
-r : (52)
Wf avf Mf P U
If the scoop effectiveness "a" is assumed to be unity and the
desired fuel concentration is 0.04 (lower flammability limit of
hydrogen in air), the scoop area required for altitudes up to 30,000
feet is approximately I0 square feet for a leak rate of I ib/sec of
hydrogen vapor. The volumetric flow rate of air through the com-
partment, calculated by means of equation (44), would be approximately
5000 ft3/sec at an altitude of i0,000 feet. The addition of a scoop
119
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with a i0 square foot frontal area to a typically large vehicle
should not increase the aerodynamic drag significantly. This area is
small compared to the tota! frontal area of the vehicle, and, if the
scoop effectiveness "a" is near unity, the drag force created will be
small.
3. Effects of Non-Uniform Fuel Distribution
In the previous section, a brief analysis was carried out of the
effects of aerodynamic venting in a well-stirred compartment. However,
it is obvious that a uniform fuel concentration cannot be maintained
throughout the compartment, no matter what means are used to promote
mixing. In particular, high fuel concentrations will exist at the
site of each leak from the system. The concentration will be highest
at the leak and will fall off with distance in all directions due to
diffusion of fuel into the surrounding medium. Thus a certain volume
surrounding the leak will contain a combustible mixture, if air is
used as the venting fluid. The magnitude of this volume will be
determined by the rate of fuel leakage and the rate of diffusion into
the surrounding air.
In attempting to determine the extent of the volume of combustible
mixture formed, the air velocity past the leak must be taken into
account, since it will affect the diffusion process. Sources of
thermal energy moving through a conducting medium have been analyzed (39)
and a relation has been established for the temperature distribution
in the medium:
121
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= !h__ exp s
T 4_Kr - _ (r - x (53)
where q = thermal energy source strength
K = thermal conductivity
U = velocity of source through fluid
s
_C = thermal diffusivity
r = radius from source
x = distance in downstream direction from source
Analagously, an expression can be written for the diffusion of
mass from a source moving through a fluid (or for a fixed source in a
moving fluid):
Wf I_ U (r - x) It_f - 4_-Dr exp L_- _D (54)
where /_ = partial density of fuel
D = mass diffusivity
In the present case, it would be difficult to utilize this relation
to predict fuel concentration profiles since the true value of the
diffusion coefficient D is unknown. Coefficients have been established
for purely molecular diffusion in non-moving fluids. However, in
moving fluids, the existence of turbulence can increase the rate of
diffusion by a large factor. The use of a molecular diffusion co-
efficient would be overly conservative. Results from mixing exper-
iments could be used to estimate diffusion coefficients. However,
the accuracy of results obtained in this manner would be poor since
the flow conditions at the leak location cannot be predicted.
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On the other hand, it is possible to draw useful qualitative
conclusions from relationships for mass diffusion. From equation (53)
it is observed that, if the fluid velocity is zero, a surface of
constant concentration is a sphere. If the concentration of interest
is the lowest flammability limit, then the combustible mixture pro-
duced by a leak will occupy a spherical volume with the leak site at
the center.
If the surrounding fluid is in motion, it is observed from
equation (54) that the distance r from the source to the concentration
boundary is reduced in all directions, except the downstream direction
x. In the direction of flow x, the distance r does not change with
velocity. If, in addition, the velocity of the fluid is accompanied
by turbulence, the diffusion coefficient will be increased. The
increased rate of diffusion will cause the concentration boundary to
move closer to the source. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
effect of fluid velocity, in general, is to reduce the volume of the
combustible mixture.
4. Conclusions
It is concluded from this analysis that aerodynamic venting can
be used to reduce the hazards associated with fuel leakage in engine
compartments of multistage rocket vehicles. It is unlikely, however,
that such hazards can be eliminated completely by aerodynamic venting
alone.
The effectiveness of aerodynamic venting is dependent upon the
123
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rate of mixing of the incoming air with the fuel vapor. It appears
that the greatest effectiveness will be achieved by maintaining
high flow velocities through the compartment so that large volumes of
combustible mixtures cannot accumulate near the site of the leakage.
High velocities might be achieved by using a small number of large
scoops with the incoming streams directed toward the fuel feed system,
rather than using a finely divided distribution system.
It appears that the addition of air scoops of the required size
would have a negligible effect on the flight performance of the vehicle.
C. Interstage Venting Requirements
i. General
Vents are incorporated in all current launch vehicle interstages
to maintain a small pressure differential across the interstage skirt.
In most cases, gas is relieved through the vents as ambient pressure
is reduced with altitude at a rate that will provide a small positive
pressure of the inert gas within the interstage. In general, the
vents have not been designed on the basis of reducing the effects of
explosions that might occur.
In some instances, careful control of the venting of the inert
gas must be maintained so that the pressure in the interior balances
the aerodynamic forces acting on the outer surfaces of the interstage
(e.g., S-II/S-lV interstage). In all cases, if the vent area is very
large, aerodynamic effects may be detrimental to the performance of
the vehicle during the early phases of flight.
Venting to reduce the effects of explosions must then operate
124
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within the confines of the required pressure balance across the inter-
stage skirt and the maintenance of positive pressure of the inert gas
to prevent air from entering the system. These limits will vary with
interstage design and flight regime.
Venting to reduce the effects of explosions on interstage struc-
tures is only effective when deflagrations rather than detonation
occur. Since detonation wave velocities are many times the speed of
sound in the unreacted mixture, there will be no gas vented as the
result of a pressure increase caused by detonation until the wave
front reaches the vent. By this time, the major structures may have
received the full force of the detonation wave. Vents may reduce the
intensity of the detonation, in some instances, however, through the
relief provided during the interval of time that combustion takes
place prior to the transition to detonation. The severity of the wave
will be reduced by the fact that the unreacted gas will be at a lower
pressure during the propagation of the wave. By keeping the pressure
low, the probability of transition to detonation will also be reduced.
2. Ventin_ Requirements--Deflagrations
The venting requirements for reducing the effects of explosions
produced by a deflagration process are difficult to define since the
inability to predict flame propagation rates and the pressure and
temperature distribution within the interstage during the combustion
process limits the effectiveness of analytical techniques. No useful
experimental data on the effect of venting on the characteristics of
125
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explosions produced by hydrogen and oxygen reactions could be found in
the literature. However, in order to provide some insight as to the
effectiveness of venting, a simplified analysis has been made for the
relatively severe case where the interstage is completely filled with
a stoichiometric gas phase mixture.
By suitable use of the ideal gas law (applied to the reactants
and products) it can be shown that the rate of outflow of gas, dm/dt
required to limit the pressure to some specified value, P e at time t
I
I
I
is:
where T
M°
i
dm iTe Pi Me ii Pe dmi (55) '
= temperature of the product gases
e
P. = pressure of the reactantsl
M = number of moles of products
e
= number of moles of reactants
dmo
= number of moles of reactants, reacting per unit time
dt
This relationship assumes that the pressure is uniform throughout
the interstage at any given time and that the temperature of the un-
reacted gas is maintained at its initial value. Only unreacted gas is
vented.
It also may be shown that the rate at which the gas reacts is
dmi Su Ab Pi (56)
dt
M.
i
I
I
I
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where S = flame velocity
u
A_ = area of the flame front
Pi = density of the reactants
M. = mean molecular weight of the reactants
i
The required rate of relief may then be expressed as
dm T__ P" M _ Pe S Ab_i
-- l e u
dt P M i _ M i
e
(57)
When the initial pressure is relatively high (i.e., near sea
level conditions), the pressure in the interstage may reach the limiting
pressure shortly after the deflagration is initiated and P may be set
e
equal to P.. Also, since at the lower altitudes, the ratio of the
l
pressure in the interstage, P , to ambient pressure will be low, the
e
flow through the vent will be subsonic and the realtlonships for incom-
pressible flow may be used. That is
d__mm= Cc Av (2_i6P)½ (58)
dt M
where A
V
= cross-sectional area of the vent
AP = Pe " Pi
C = contraction coefficient
c
Substituting this expression in equation (57), the ratio of vent
area to flame area for a given limiting interstage pressure is as
follows:
Av _2/3% re Su
(59)
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When the initial pressure is low (at higher altitudes), a large
portion of the gas may burn before P is reached; hence P # P.. Also,
e e i
the ratio of internal to external pressure will be high and sonic flow
will occur. Using the expressions for choked flow and equation (57),
it can be shown that the ratio of vent area to flame area required for
a pressure P is
e
_2 iII Tel ½ u
A T P. S
__VA_= 0.0227 /3 T.I Pe LT_i I _fTi
(60)
Vent areas that will provide the degree of effectiveness implied
by these relationships may be derived for specific launch vehicles by
setting a maximum value for the flame area equal to the interior sur-
faces of the interstage.
On setting a value for the maximum allowable pressure differential
across the interstage skirt equal to P - Pi' a value for the flamee
temperature, and by assuming values for the initial temperature and
pressure of the unburned gas, estimates of the vent area ratios may
be made. This has been done for the S-IC/S-II interstage, as an
example, using the following values:
P - P. = 2 psia
e l
T = 530°R
Pi 4,('=i atm.
( i ps ia
T = 4500°R
e
For the sea level case (Pi = i atm) using equation (59), the
^
ratio of -_ turns out to be 0.3_ whereas at low pressures
%
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(Pi = I psia) utilizing equation (60) the ratio is 0.16. Taking A b
equal to the surface area described by the maximum diameter and length
of the interstage_ the vent area for a ratio (for the worst case) of
0.3 would be of the order of i000 ft 2. This may be compared with the
vent area of 3 ft 2 that is currently employed in the vehicle.
An increase in the vent area by the proportion indicated for the
S-IC/S-II interstage could add to the explosive hazard by markedly
increasing the likelihood that air would enter the system. Also, since
this vent area would occupy more than 40 per cent of the skirt area,
adverse effects resulting from aerodynamic loadings may be unduly
severe.
Blowout panels that would be forced from the vehicle as a result
of the increased pressure applied during the early phases of the ex-
plosion would help to avoid these problems. However, they will recur
after the panels have been removed unless this action takes place at
altitudes well above the point where the maximum aerodynamic forces
(maximum Q) on the vehicle are created.
Since there will be some benefit achieved through an increase in
vent area at the higher altitudes, it would appear desirable to provide
a means of automatically increasing the vent size at a point in flight
where the aerodynamic effects no longer play a major role. At alti-
tudes less than this, the utilization of blowout panels, or increased
vent area, would not appear to be good practice.
D. Compartmenting
The severity of both deflagrations and detonations is dependent
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upon the quantity of explosive mixture that reacts. This suggests
that improvements may be derived by using compartments within the
interstage to limit the quantity of reactants that may accumulate as
the result of a leak. One approach would be to fill the entire
space with an easily removable low density material. An example of
this technique would be the incorporation of nonporous plastic spheres
of a few inches in diameter. Spaces between the spheres would allow
the leaked gases to vent.
The weight introduced by the filling material will be much greater
than can be allowed in most launch vehicles. If a very light-weight
material such as double free expanded polystyrene beads were used, the
lowest density achievable would be of the order of 1/2 to i pound per
ft3. For a free volume of 15,000 ft3, as in the S-IC/S-II interstage,
this would represent some 8 to 15 thousand pounds.
If, on the other hand, the interstage were divided into indi-
vidually vented but separate compartments through the use of light-
weight membranes, for example, the added weight might be significantly
reduced. A large fraction of the free volume where there is no source
of hydrogen nor oxygen leakage would not have to be compartmented. A
membrane separating this space from areas where leakage may occur
would suffice. In those spaces where leakage can occur, the compartment
volumes would have to be similar to or smaller than the volumes of
gas defined by the establishment of minimum leakage rates for deto-
nation. This turns out to be a volume represented by a sphere of less
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than one foot in diameter. This is so small that it would not be very
different than providing separate enclosures around each potential
source of leakage. This would essentially involve leakage control
which is considered to be beyond the scope of this work.
In conclusion, it appears that the addition of compartments to
the interstage to reduce the effects of an explosion is not practical.
Either the system will weigh too much or the compartments will approach
the dimensions of systems that would be better considered as leak
control devices.
E. Hardening of Interstage Structures
The interstage skirt will be the component which is most suscep-
tible to blast damage from a hydrogen-oxygen gas phase detonation.
The dimensions of the skirt are large and therefore its weight is not
negligible. Thickening the panel would represent a large additional
mass to the missile system which would constitute a severe operational
penalty. Therefore, the conclusion is drawn that hardening of major
components is not reconm_ended. Conversely, smaller components, even
if they represent structures such as the heat shield_ could be brought
up in strength without great weight penalties. Honeycomb structures
with stronger restraints might easily be incorporated. However, this
hardening procedure would provide little benefit to the over-all
ability of the interstage to survive detonation.
F. Prevention of Accumulated Condensed Phase Mixtures
If escaping liquid hydrogen and oxygen impinge upon a concave
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surface at a sufficient rate and duration, the surface may be cooled
to the extent that a condensed phase mixture would collect. The
accumulation of the condensed phase mixture could present a destruc-
tive hazard.
This hazard may be reduced by the elimination of small concave
surfaces that are capable of being cooled rapidly and that would tend
to collect the condensed fluids. Larger surfaces with more heat capac-
ity would, in general, require higher leakage rates before sufficient
cooling was achieved for the deposit of the liquids or solids. It is
reconmlended, however, that consideration be given to the addition of
heat to those critical surfaces in the interstage where the condensed
phase may collect.
G. Intentional Ignition Sources
It has been shown that the severity of an explosion of hydrogen
and oxygen (or air) is highly dependent upon the quantity of reactive
mixture that is present when ignition occurs. The quantity of material
that could accumulate at the time of ignition could theoretically be
reduced by the use of an ever present ignition source such as pilot
flames, hot wires, etc.
To be effective these ignition sources must be placed in a manner
that will insure early ignition. If not, the sources may increase the
explosion hazard by providing an ignition source after a considerable
quantity of combustible material has accumulated when no other ignition
source is present.
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Because of the difficulty of predicting the location where flam-
mable mixtures may occur, it has been concluded that with present
knowledge the design of an intentional ignition system cannot be
achieved with sufficient probability that it will not cause a delayed
(and destructive) ignition. The use of intentional ignition sources
is not recommended.
H. Weight Comparison of Control TechniQues
Of the various techniques for the elimination and control of
explosions in an interstage the well-stirred, inert purging case is
the only method amenable to a weight analysis that is applicable to
interstagesin general. The comparative weights as a function of
leakage rate are given in Figure 26.
Other purging techniques involving aerodynamic and inert with
other types of mixing require either experimental effort or involve
factors related to a specific vehicle design in order to establish
weight as a function of effectiveness. This is also true of venting
techniques. Other control methods are either not recommended or have
a relatively small influence on weight.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL WORK
It has become evident in this study that additional experimental
and analytical data would add significantly to the evaluation of explosive
hazards in vehicle interstages and would form the basis for better
decisions as to the optimum means of prevention and control of explosions.
As knowledge is increased_ the precautionary measures that have to be
taken should impose less severe penalties and provide a lighter_ less
complex system.
Additional effort in the following areas is recommended.
A. The Impulsive Loading of Detonation Waves--Analytical
It is recommended that the calculation of impulse due to the
reflection of a detonation wave on surfaces of various geometries be
refined. In particular 3 the effects of walls of various curvatures
and converging passages need further study for_ in some cases_ they
may result in more severe loadings than those evaluated in this study.
The effect of diluents on the state and flow properties at the
detonation front for a reflected wave also requires further evaluation.
Calculations using the methods presented in this report would be
applied. However_ it is recommended that a computer be used to provide
a means of obtaining a network of information that would incorporate_ in
parametric form_ all of the major factors that govern the loading effects
of detonations within an interstage.
134
_rthur _l._.Little, B1tr.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
i
'1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
B. The Impulsive Loading of Detonation Waves-- Experimental
Estimates of pressure loading on structures by detonation waves
has been primarily determined by analytical means. An experimental program
is recommended for verifying and supplementing these efforts. This
program would involve the initiation of detonations in various mixtures
of interest contained in vessels of various configurations. Careful
measurement of pressure and velocity would provide basic data that would
be necessary for the verification of the analytical estimates.
C. Response of Structures to Detonations
A hydrogen-oxygen (diluent) gas phase detonation imposes a
diffraction or drag load on a structure that is quite different in nature
than that from the more thoroughly analyzed free air blasts. In this
program analytical predictions of the blast effects occurring as the
result of direct impingement of the detonation wave on the structure
have been made. Dynamic structural analyses based on theoretical load
inputs have been carried out.
It is believed that an experimental correlation is in order for the
verification of these analyses. Elementary structural components_
beams and supported plates should be exposed to laboratory controlled
gas phase detonations. The response of the structures would be measured
and compared to the predicted dynamic stress levels.
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D. Transition from Deflagration to Detonation
Theory and experimental data that has been generated to date are
insufficient to allow a prediction to be made as to whether a detonation
will occur when a detonable mixture is formed in an interstage. It is
known that there will be a distance of travel of the deflagration wave
before transition to detonation takes place. This distance has been
defined experimentally for relatively simple configurations. It is
impossible to relate the results of these experiments to the complex
geometry of an interstage. Furthermore_ induction distances at reduced
temperatures and pressures have not been well established.
It is realized that complete simulation of the various conditions
that may prevail in an interstage would be extremely difficult. Tests
with simplified models that produce more severe conditions for transition
would aid immeasurably in defining the real hazards of detonation.
E. Venting
The use of enlarged vents or blow out panels appear to offer some
utility particularly after the vehicle has passed through the regime
of severe aerodynamic loading. There is little or no experimental data
on the effect of vents on gas phase explosions. It has been pointed out
that vents offer the possibility of reducing the probability of occurrence
of detonations and would reduce the pressures produced by deflagrations.
It is expected that an experimental program to establish the benefits
of venting (or blow out panels) would provide the impetus necessary for
the design of a system that would allow the use of enlarged vents through
the entire flight regime. This program would again entail the initiation
136
_rthur _)._ittlc._,tr.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
of explosive mixtures at various temperatures and pressures. The effect
of various vents and blow out panels would be evaluated in terms of the
pressures produced.
F. Purging
The benefits of purging either with inert gases or aerodynamically
have been pointed out in this study. Experimental effort is required,
however, to further refine the estimates of the mixing that can be
achieved. Flow experiments in simulated scale models of portions of
typical interstages are recon_nended.
G. Condensed Phase Reactions
There is a severe lack of basic information on the formation of
condensed phase mixtures in an interstage and on the explosive hazards
that they may create. Experimental effort related to the formation of
condensed phase mixtures, their ignition and propagation and the pressure
loadings that would be produced is badly needed. It is understood that
a program of this type is currently being implemented and is under the
sponsorship of the George Marshall Space Flight Center.
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APPENDIX A
A. Gas Dynamics of Spher_al Detonation
The requirements for initiating a spherical detonation wave are
more demanding than for cylindrical or plane detonation. Energy must be
supplied to support the radially diverging detonation out to radii which
are much larger than the thickness of the reaction zone. When the radius
of curvature becomes large compared to the thickness of the reaction
zone, the detonation wave can be expected to have essentially the same
properties as those of a plane wave. A study of the energy required for
initiation was made by Zel'dovich. (I) Besides deriving the energy require-
ment, he conducted experiments in which he (a) observed spherical detona-
tion waves, (b) measured the energy required for their initiation, and
(c) obtained good agreement with theory.
Spherical detonation has been observed in the past, both in
gaseous(l'2)and in solid(3)media.
I. Assumptions
In analyzing the behavior of the burnt products of detonation, we
make the following assumptions:
I. The reaction zone thickness is negligible.
2. The undetonated mixture is at rest at uniform
pressure and density.
3. The burnt product is a perfect gas.
4. The flow of burnt product is adiabatic.
5. The Chapman-Jouguet condition is obeyed.
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2. Equations of Motion
The equations of continuity for momentum, mass and energy in the
case of spherical symmetry may be written as:
v + v v + _ = 0
Pr (A-l)r
+ 2 _ = 0 (A-2)P + (PV)r r
(plpY) + v (PlPY)r = 0 (A-3)
The dot sign and the subscript r represent differentiation with respect
to time and radius, respectively.
3. Transformation of Variables
The rules of dimensional analysis may be employed to determine
whether there is any similitude in the flow pattern which would allow
some simplification in the problem of solving equations (A-1,2,3).
Sedov (4) used fundamental similarity laws to show that, when a spherical
detonation wave has proceeded out to radii such that the region affected
by the initiation appears small (and, of course, such that the reaction
zone appears very thin, as we have assumed), there is a similarity of
flow pattern which permits great simplification in handling the gas-
dynamical equations. Taylor (5) has determined the flow pattern for
spherical detonation in T.N.T., based on a remarkable intuition as to
how the simplification may proceed•
The simplification shown to be valid by Sedov lles in the possibility
of expressing all flow variables as functions of a single parameter
_ r/Dr = r/Ro, that is, the ratio of the radius of interest to the
radius of the detonation front at the time of interest. When this is
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done, the partial differential equations (A-1,2,3) reduce to ordinary
differential equations.
We define _, V, R, P and Z as follows:
_-_E_r (A-4)
Dt
v _= r V (_) = D _ V (A-D)
t
P = PI R (_) (A-6)
P- PI (r2/t2) P (_) = PI D2 _2p (A-7)
Z (_)- ye/R (A-8)
We substitute into (A-I,2) the expressions for v, pand p given in
the defining equations (A-5,6,7), and make use of (A-8), to obtain:
d__g= 2Z [Y(V-I_2 + (y-l) (V-l) - Z] (A-9)
dV {V-l) 3 + (V-I) 2 -3Z(V-I) -3Z
= Z- (V-I_ 2 (A-10)
dV (V-l)3+ (V-I) 2 -3Z (V-l) -3Z
These equations can be written more simply in terms of W_ V-I:
dZ = 2Z [yW2 + ([-i) W -Z]
dW (W+I) (W 2 -3Z)
(A-II)
d In_ _ Z - W2 (A-12)
dW (w+ I) (w2 -3z)
Equation (A-3), which represents energy conservation, is replaced
by an adiabatic integral, a consequence of the conservation of entropy,
which for a perfect gas may be expressed as follows:
yp z const (A-13)
R--W=i-_l:--f_-
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Equation (A-13) can be interpreted as a statement that all gas particles
suffer the same entropy change due to the passing of the detonation wave;
therefore, for adiabatic flow of burnt product, the entropy of that gas,
and the ratio p/pY if it is a perfect gas, is constant.
4. Boundary Conditions
Equations (A-II,12,13) are to be solved simultaneously for Z (_),
W (_) and R (_), in conjunction with boundary conditions at the detona-
tion front. These are found by specifying conditions just ahead of the
shock front (i.e., in the undetonated mixture), and Joining them to those
Just behind the reaction zone through the Rankine-Hugoniot (R-H) relations
and the C-J condition. We have
Conditions at I (Just upstream of the shock)
V = 0, or W = -I (A-14)
i I
Pl _iTI
m. m
P1 _D2 7
R1 pllPl1
(A-15)
(A-16)
= R /R = I (A-17)
I o o
= Yl Pl / (PI D2)
_ Y#ITI
D2
YPI
zI -
RI
Relations across the shock (R-H)
(A-IS)
R2W2 = RIWI (A-19)
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IZ2 Z1
W 2 + - WI + __ (A-20) I
y 2W2 )IiW1
i 2 Z2 i 2 ZI
2 W2 + W_---_= _ WI +-- + Q
YI -I D2
(A-21)
Conditions at 2(C-J)
Z2 = W22 (A-22)
Instead of solving simultaneously for Q, D, and the properties at
2, we wish to make use of information available in the literature (6)
I
I
I
giving Q, D, and Y2 as functionsof conditions at i. In order to utilize
that information directly, we manipulate equations (A-14) to (A-22)
(except A-21) into the following form:
w2 = - Y2 RITI (A-23)
l+y 2 (i +--• D2 )
2
Z2 = W2 (A-24)
(A-25)
R2 = - _22
(A-26)
W2
P2 =-_2
Equations (A-23, 24) give boundary values of W and Z for equations (A-II,
12), in terms of the initial temperature, and D and_calculated else-
where. (6) Equation (A-25) gives R2, which is needed, in conjunction
with Z2, to determine the value of the constant in equation (A-13).
Finally, the expression for P2' although not necessary for solving
equations (A-II, 12) is shown as a matter of interest. Of course, P (>0
_[rthur _.'_ittlc,_nr.
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(with P (I) = P2) is one of the important results of this analysis; it
can be obtained from Z (_) and R (_) after equations (A-II, 12) are
so ived.
From Table 3 in Reference (6)_ it can be inferred that RITi/D 2 is
never greater than 0.03 for cases of interest and may be neglected in
Equation (A-23); substitution of the simplified expression into (A-26)
gives
I (A-27)
P2 = i +_2
and from the definition of P2 we obtain an expression for the pressure
ratio across the detonation wave:
P2 i D2
p_ = I +Y2 RITI (A-28)
This relationship is followed very closely by the results in Reference (6)
We restrict ourselves to a stoichiometric hydrogen-oxygen mixture.
The results of the work in Reference(6) show that D and_for the products
of detonation of a gaseous explosive depend on the initial pressure and
temperature. However, for the ranges expected (pressures from 0.i to i
atmosphere; temperatures of 300 ° K or less) D varies by no more than 3%
about a mean value of 9150 feet per second. The value of Yaffects the
form of the relations, V (_), P (_), R (_), sinceyappears in the equa-
tions whose solutions gives these relations. Upon solving these equations
for two extreme values of _, we find the differences to be unimportant,
and in setting boundary conditions in the present context, we use a
mean value (_2 = 1.123).
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5. Solution
Equations (A-II) and (A-12) are non-linear, and their solution re-
quires numerical computation. The equations need not be solved simul-
taneously, however, since (A-II) contains only Z and W. We, therefore,
proceeded as follows:
(i) Solve (A-II), with boundary values (Z2, W2) at the detonation
front_ to obtain Z (W).
(ii) Solve (A-12), which can now be written
d in_ W 2 -Z (W)
= (A- 19)
dW (W + l[3Z (W) - wmJ)
with_= i at the detonation front, to obtain W (_).
(iii) Obtain Z LW (_)] = Z (_).
(iv) Use equation (A-13) with the constant evaluated at the detona-
tion front, together with Z (_), to obtain R (_).
(v) Obtain P (_) from Z (_), R (_) and the definition of Z.
(vi) Calculate V (_) = I + W (_).
(vii) From the respective definitions calculate P/P2' FJ/P2 ' v/v2 as
functions of _; the subscript 2 refers to conditions just
behind the detonation front.
The results of these calculations are presented in Figure 13 of
the main text.
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APPENDIX B
A. Effect of a Detonation Wave at Normal Incidence on a Ri$id Wall
i. Characteristics of Wave Reflection
As a detonation wave reflects from a wall, the shape of the wave
and the pressure at the wall will be as depicted in Figure B-I. We con-
sider only spherical waves.
Just before impact with the wall (Figure B-l(a))_ the pressure
varies with distance in the manner discussed in Appendix A. The presence
of the wall does not as yet influence the pressure distribution. The
pressure at the wall_ Pwall_ is still that of the undisturbed_ undetonated
mixture_ PI'
An infinitesimal time interval after impact (Figure B-l(b)), Pwall
has become more than double the pre-impact detonation front pressure.
The wave is proceeding away from the wall, into the burnt products
(Figures B-l(b, c)). Meanwhile, Pwall is decreasing.
Figure B-l-(d) illustrates conditions at the time when Pwall has
fallen back to its original value, PI' thus, ending the impulsive load-
ing on the wall. There may be succeeding impulses on the wall, caused
by reflection and return from other points, but the first impulse is the
most severe and is the one we consider in this Appendix.
2. The Analytical Problem
To determine the impulsive load on the wall, we must determine
Pwall as a function of time, and integrate it over the impulsive inter-
val. The value of Pwall at any time during that interval depends on
p(r, t), iO(r, t) and v (r, t) at all points within the gas volume from
150
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the time of impact until that time. The determination of these functions
can begin at the moment of impact (t = o), since the functions are known
at that time.
To determine the functions requires integrating the equations of
motion, with boundary conditions at the origin of initiation and at the
wall, and matching at the returning shock front. A detailed solution
of this problem requires the use of an electronic computer.
3. Approximate Solution
At the time of impact (t = o) the gas properties, p,_and v are
known everywhere in the region of interest. They are also known at t_o,
in the region not yet traversed by the reflected shock wave, since the
effect of the oncoming (supersonic) shock wave is not yet felt in that
region; therefore, the gas there continues to behave as if the wave had
not reflected, but had continued radially outward unimpeded. Therefore,
the functions F _0, R (_, V _k), where _= r/Dt as discussed in
Appendix A, still apply. However, in this case the time, t, equals that
required for the wave to reach the wall (t = Rwall/D ) plus the time
elapsed since then. Hence, now
r (B-l)>k = R + Dt
wall
where t is the time from impact and the denominator equals the distance
the wave would have traveled in the absence of the wall. Thus, at a
given value of r,_ varies with time after impact.
Consider the time, t, at which the reflected wave just reaches a
point at a distance, r, from the initiation point, as in Figure B-l(c).
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_thur _.tl.ittle,_ur.
It is possible to apply the laws of conservation of mass, momentum and
energy to the control volume contained between r and Rail , over the
interval 0 to t I. In the case of spherical symmetry, this control volume
is a spherical shell of thickness (Rail - r) o
To apply the conservation laws, we equate the changes in total mass,
momentum and energy within the control volume during the interval tl, to
the time-integrals of the fluxes of these quantities at the boundaries r
and Rail"
As previously stated, at t = o all properties are known within the
control volume. Therefore, the initial total mass, momentum and energy
can be found by integration.
To express the final total mass, momentum and energy, we make a
linearized approximation. The pressure distribution, at time tl, is
assumed to be linear (line a, b in Figure B-l(c) is assumed straight).
Similar assumptions are made regarding density and particle velocity at
time tI. Thus, the final total mass, etc., can be expressed in an
approximate manner in terms of the boundary values at time t I. These
are py,iOy, Vy just downstream of the shock, and Pwl'%l' Vbl at the
wall (see Figure B-l(c)). The first five quantities are unknown; Vbl
if of course zero.
The fluxes at r are known at all times up to time, tl, since during
that time all properties can be found through the value of _evaluated
from Equation (B-l). Note that t I is unknown, but that the time-integrals
of the fluxes can be found as functions of tI.
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Because the velocity is zero at the wall, there is only one non-zero
flux there, namely the pressure (flux of momentum). Its initial value
Pwo is that represented in Figure B-l(b), and is found by applying the
_ shock is therefore notRankine-Hugoniot (R-H) relations across ,e . D
"WO
an unknown in the present calculation. We linearize the time-variation
in pressure at the wall and approximate the time-integral of pressure by
i/2(Pwo + Pwl)tl •
From the R-H relations applied at the wall at t = o, we can also
find Vwo , the initial velocity of the reflected shock wave. The R-H re-
lations applied at point r, time tl, give three relationships between
px,_Ox, Vx, (all known) and py,/Oy, Vy, V I. The last quantity is the
velocity of the reflected shock wave as it passes point r. We linearize
the time variation in V and use a mean value, to obtain a relation:
w
R - r
wall (B-2)tl = I
_(v o + Vwl)
There are now seven unknowns: py, _y, Vy, Pwl' VI' tl" These
are related by the same number of equations: three conservation equations
for the control volume, three R-H relations applied at r, tl, and equa-
tion (B-2). The set of equations can therefore be solved simultaneously.
We can therefore find an approximate value for the pressure at the
wall at the time when the reflected wave reaches a point r, by solving
the equations just discussed. The solution can be repeated, for various
values of r, until we find a pressure at the wall which is equal to or
less than the initial pressure of undetonated gas, such as is represented
in Figure B-l(d). When this is done, we have available the initial and
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final pressures at the wall, and the time interval t2 required for the
change. This information can be used to obtain an approximate expression
for the impulse at the wall:
I i
= _ (Pwo + Pw2 ) t2 (B-B)
which was required. In discussing the solution of the problem, the
flow variables were used. These can be normalized with respect to the
detonation wave properties and initial explosive properties. Thus, in
Figure 14 of the main text which shows the results of our calculations,
we have plotted a normalized pressure against a normalized time.
The integral below the curve of Figure 14 is therefore also normaliz-
ed, and we can express it as (see Figure 14):
I = I (1.17/O1 D2) (0.3Rwall/D)A 2
-- 0.175 D/O I Rail
ib-sec (B-4)
= 50 IOI Rail 2
ft
ib/ft 3 .
where _91 = the initial mixture density, in
Rail = the distance between the wall and the point of initiation,
in feet.
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I (a) t -: 0 Vw
I Point of IgnitlonJ -- * rRwall _ wall = Pl
/Pwall = Pwo
,<_>t--°+ 1
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
(c) t l > 0
!
t
I
(d) t2 > tl
a
Pwall = P w 1
wall = Pl
FIGURE B- 1 SHAPE OF PRESSURE WAVE AND WALL PRESSURE
DURING REFLECTION OF A DETONATION WAVE
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APPENDIX C
A. Calculation of Maximum Bending Stress
i. Clamped Uniform Beam
Consider a clamped uniform beam of length _ cross-sectional area
S, width b and density /69. The beam is initially at rest. When the
beam is loaded with a uniform impulsive load P (psi-sec)_ it acquires
instantaneously a velocity given by bP/f9 S. Therefore_ the total
kinetic energy of the beam is given by:
K. E. = b2_p2 (C-l)
21oS
When the beam is loaded with a uniform static load q (ib/ft),
the deflection of the beam y satisifies the differential equation:
E1 d4 y
dx 4
= q (C-2)
where E is Young's modulus of elasticity and I is the area moment of
inertia of the cross-section of the beam.
Subject to the boundary conditions that y and its derivative with
respect to x must vanish at x = 0 and _=_;the solution of equation (C-2)
is:
q (x4 _2 _ 3 _2x + x2) (c-3)
Y = 24EI
Then the total strain energy of the beam is:
Z
i o/[qydx = q 2 _ 5S. E. = 2 1440EI (c-4)
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Equating this strain energy to the kinetic energy given by
equation (C-I)_ we obtain the following value of the unknown q:
bP " E1
q = 26.8 i'll
_2 L I S
(c-5)
Now_ the maximum bending stress ,3 will occur at the ends
max
of the beam. From equations (C-3) and (C-5)_ we obtain:
1
(3- = 1.12 bhP i]-_
n_Rx
(C-6)
where h is the depth of the beam. Finally_ substituting for P from
equation (21) (of the main text) and using the values of E and f) for
steel or aluminum_ we obtain equation (23).
for beams with other boundarySimilarly_ we can obtain max
conditions.
2. Rectangular Uniform Plates
Consider a rectangular plate with sides a and b_ uniform thickness
h and density i_ When the plate is loaded with a uniform impulsive
load P_ it acquires instantaneously a velocity equal to p//O h.
Therefore_ the total kinetic energy of the plate is given by:
K.E. - abp2 (C-7)
2 Ph
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When the plate is loaded with a uniform static load q (psi)_ the
deflection of the plate w satifies the differential equation:
04 _4w _4
w + 2 w _ _____
4 x 2 y2 + -0 x d _ _ y4 D
(c-8)
where D is the flexural rigidity of the plate given by:
h 3 E
D = (C-9)
12(I-V _2)
being Poisson's ratio•
After the solution for w_ satisfying equation (C-8) and the
appropriate boundary conditions_ is obtained_ the total strain energy
of the plate can be computed from:
a b
S. E = ----q--- _ dx 1 wdy (C- i0)
• 2
O O
By equating this strain energy to the kinetic energy given by
equation (C-7)_ the value of the unknown q is determined• Then the
maximum bending moments and stresses in the plate are determined.
The calculation of the integral in equation (C-10) involves very
long and tedious integrations. A quite accurate value of this volume
integral can be obtained by approximating it by the volume of a
pyramid with height equal to the maximum deflection wma x. This
approximation is very convenient because values of wma x as well as of
the maximum bending moment Mma x as functions of b/a and of the boundary
conditions have been tabulated. In general_ one has the following
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relations :
i
S.E. - 6 abqwmax (C- ii)
4
--,i _ (c-12)Wmax D
= _ qa 2 (C- 13)
M
max
_3' 6
- M (C-14)
max h 2 max
where ._ and i_ are constants depending on the ratio of the sides
b/a and on the boundary conditions. They are well tabulated.
From equations (C-7, C-9, C-II_ and C-12)3 we obtain:
2
q
h2 E p2
4_/_4 (i- _'2)
(c-15)
Then_ from equations (C-13 to C-15)_ we obtain:
max - h _P (I- _/_2)
(C-16)
Finally, using the values of E_ p and _ for steel or aluminum and the
value of P from equation (22)3 we obtain equation (24)--in the main text.
APPENDIX D
A. Comparison of Results with some Possible Exact Solutions
i. Uniform Beams
Exact solutions can always be obtained by superposition of the
natural modes of vibration with time-dependent coefficients. For
example 3 the bending moment M at the middle of a simply supported beam
158
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
_rthur/3._littb,]l.r.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
loaded impulsively by a uniform load P (psi-sec) is given by:
oo
n-__ilM - 4 bP _--_-E1 (-i) 2 s in CO t
"/'T ' 2u _ n n
n=133...
where the natural frequencies of vibration 6_ ! are given by:
n
(D-l)
-° ' " E-I-- (D-2)63 = /I n
n ft.) 2
Now_ to find the maximum bending moment Mmax_ equation (D-I) must
be plotted as a function of t. Such a plot will give the value of M
max
as well as the times at which it occurs. On the other hand_ if we take
only the first term of the series, then:
Mma x = 1.27 BP Ey_ (D-3)
The second term of the series has a frequency nine times higher and an
amplitude as given by equation (D-3) with 1.27 replaced by -0.423. The
maximum total bending moment computed by the present approximate theory
is the same as that given by equation (D-3) with 1.27 replaced by 1.37.
A similar comparison can be carried out for a clamped beam. The
numerical constants of the fundamental and first harmonic of the bending
moment at the ends of beam are 1.70 and 0.728. The present approximate
theory gives a value of 2.24 for the numerical constant of the maximum
total bending moment.
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2. Simply Supported Rectangular Uniform Plate
The rectangular uniform plate loaded impulsively with a uniform
load p is one of few cases for which an exact solution is possible.
For simplicity_ we will consider a square plate. It can be shown that
I
I
I
the bending moment_at the_middle of the plate is given by: I
_/_ m-i n-i (D-4)M = 0.492 Ph m2+0"3n2 (-i) T (-i) -_---sin_ t
= .. m=l_3., mn(m2+n 2) mn I
Poisson's ratio has been taken equal to 0.3.
vibration _J are given by:
mn
The natural frequencies of
2
_fF (m2 + n2) _r--_ (D-5)
_mn = a 2 to h
Thus_ we see that the numerical constant of the first 3 second and third
components of the bending moment is 0.32_ -0.153_ and -0.0607_ respectively.
I
I
I
I
According to the present approximate theory 3 the numerical constant of
t he maximum total bending moment is 0.394.
APPENDIX E
A. Numerical Derivation of Maximum Allowable Radius of Stoichiometric
Mixture
i. The Effect of a Detonation on the S-IC/S-II Interstage Skirt
A panel of the interstage skirt is considered as a rectangular plate
with clamped edges and with dimensions as shown in Figure 19. The ratio
of the sides is equal to 1.5. Hence_ from Table VI_ the values of the
constants 0_ and _are 0.0022 and 0.0757_ respectively. The thickness
of the plate h is equal to 0.070 inches. Using a value for _" equal
max
to 76_000 psi (for 7075-T6 aluminum) and an average value of T equal
O
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to 500°R, we obtain from equation (24) the following relationship
between R and Po:
_- h T o (rma x
R =
2.48 x I05_ Po
(Q.0022) ½ (0.07) (500) (76,000) 6.65
(2.48 x 105 ) (0.0757) Po - Po
where R is in feet and Po in psi.
2. The Effect of a Detonation on the Propellant Feed Lines
(26)
Sections of the H 2 and 02 feed lines can be considered as simply
supported beams 150 inches in length and with an annular cross-section
8 inches in diameter and 0.025 inches thick. The area moment of inertia
I and the area S of the cross-section are:
I = (3.14) (0.025) (4) 3 = 5.02 in4
2
S = (3.14) (0.025) (8) = 0.628 in
The width b and depth h of the cross-section are equal to the diameter)
i.e., 8 inches. The drag coefficient CD of a cylinder in supersonic
flow is equal to 1.4. Taking the average temperature T equal to 500°R
o
and a value of _ equal to 25)000 psi (one-fourth the ulti_te strength
_x
of stainless steel), the following relationship between R and Po can be
computed from equation (23)--with_ equal to 1.94 for a simply supported
beam--
R = O-maxT° _ = (25,000) (500) (0.628 x 5.02) _ 56.8 (28)
2,240_'bhPoC D (2,240) (1.94) (8) (8) (l.4)p ° - Po
where R is in feet and Po in psi. Note that the result is independent
of the length of the pipe.
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APPENDIX F
A. Sample Calculations
The examples given in this appendix are intended to illustrate the
manner in which some of the derivations presented in this report may be
used in considering the prevention and control of explosions in an
interstage.
Problem i: If the ambient pressure in the interstage is one
atmosphere (sea level) what is the maximum allowable quantity of hydrogen
that could be detonated in the S-IC/S-II interstage without causing failure
of a propellant feed line?
Solution: It was estimated in the text that the maximum radius (R)
of a detonable mixture of hydrogen and oxygen that could occur without
causing failure of a propellant feed line can be expressed as:
R - 56.8 (28)
2
Po
The weight of hydrogen and oxygen encompassed by this radius can be
estimated as on page 94 of the text as follows:
MW (56.8) 3
M = 4_f'/3 (144) RT 2
o Po
substituting the following values:
MW = 12
R = 1545
T = 500
o
Po = 14.7
M becomes approximately 8 ibs.
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Hence, approximately (8/9) (8) or 0.7 ib of hydrogen is the
maximum that could be detonated at sea level pressure without causing
damage to the feed lines from a detonation.
Problem 2: If the interstage skirt panel used as an example on
page 157 were doubled in thickness how would this effect the maximum
allowable leakage rate based on a detonation? What would be the approximate
weight increase?
Solution: From equation (26) as expressed in Appendix E, it may be
seen that the maximum allowable radius (R) of a detonable mixture is
proportional to the thickness of the panel. Since the quantity of
detonable is proportional to R 3 equation (20) then may be modified as
follows:
M - 2.76 x 23 = 22.1
2 2
Po Po
By plotting M vs. flight time as in Figure 23, the maximum allowable
rate of leakage is estimated to be 48.5 x 10 -4 Ibs of hydrogen and oxygen
or 5.4 x 10-4 ibs and 43.1 x 10-4 ibs of hydrogen and oxygen respectively.
This is roughly eight times the leakage rate allowed with the standard
panel. The time in flight where the most critical detonation hazard
would occur at this leakage rate would be of the order of 35 seconds
(from the plot as in Figure 23). The radius of the detonable mixture
would be i.I feet.
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If it is assumed that the skirt panels have a surface area of
the order of 2600 feet2_ doubling the thickness will result in a weight
increase of the order of 2500 ibs.
Problem 3: In problem 2_ it was estimated that the maximum allowable
leakage rate of liquid hydrogen would be of the order of 5.4 x 10 -4 ibs
if the skirt paneling were doubled in thickness. What rate of helium
purge gas would be required to prevent a detonation occurring if hydrogen
leaked at the above rate (assuming that both the leakage and purge started
at lift-off and instantaneous mixing occurs)?
Solution: From Figure 24_ it can be seen that the rate of helium
purge required would be less than 0.i ib/sec and the weight of the purge
system from Figure 26 would be very small. Since the radius of detonable
mixture necessary to cause damage when no purge is added is of the order
of i foot_ it may be difficult to achieve sufficient mixing to insure that
the detonation does not occur_ however. Higher rates of purge injection
would_ in general_ aid in the mixing and reduce the probability of a
destructive detonation occurring.
Problem 4: The maximum allowable quantity of hydrogen and oxygen
that may be allowed in order not to create a hazardous deflagration in
the S-IC/S-II interstage can be estimated from equation (16) of the text
by multiplying the maximum allowable leakage rate by the time after
launch (beyond which a hazard would no longer exist). For hydrogen this
would be 8.2 x 10-4 x ii0 or 0.09 ibs (see Table V). If a larger quantity
than this (and the corresponding amount of oxygen necessary for a
stoichiometric mixture) reacted at some period of time prior to ii0
seconds_ would there be some periods of time when the pressures produced
164
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would not be destructive?
Solution: From the equation of state, it can be shown that the
increase in pressure in the interstage caused by the reaction of a
pocket ("gas bubble") of a flanmmble mixture can be approximated by:
R
Pe - P" = --i VT (Np Tp - Nr Tr)
where P = pressure when reaction is completed
e
P. = pressure in interstage irmnediately prior to reaction
i
R = gas constant
VT = free volume of the interstage
N = number of moles of the products of the reaction
P
T = temperature of the products
P
N = number of moles of reactants
r
T = temperature of the reactants
r
This equation shows that the value of P - P. does not depend on
e 1
the initial pressure. For a hydrogen and oxygen mixture (and nitrogen
as the inert gas in the interstage)3 the pressure difference is
primarily dependent on the quantity of reactable mixture (Nr) available
at the time of reaction. Since the difference P - Po is used as the
e 1
criterion for destructive damage, a deflagration involving more than
0.09 ibs of hydrogen (and the necessary oxygen for the reaction) in the
interstage any time up to and beyond ii0 seconds in flight would produce
destructive pressures.
165
By the samereasoning_ a deflagration involving less than this
quantity would not be destructive at any period in flight.
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